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Abstract 
Over the past 25 years, significant levels of public debt and external finance are more likely to 
have enhanced macroeconomic vulnerability than economic growth in developing countries.  This 
conclusion applies not just to countries with a history of high inflation and past default, but also 
to those in East Asia, with a long tradition of prudent macroeconomic policies and rapid growth.  
We examine why with the help of a conceptual framework drawn from the growth, capital flows 
and crisis literature for developing countries with access to the international capital markets 
('market access countries' or MACs).  We find that, while the chances of another generalized debt 
crisis have receded since the turbulence of the late 1990s, sovereign debt is indeed constraining 
growth in MACs, especially those with debt sustainability problems.  Several prominent MACs 
have sought to address the debt and external finance problem by generating large primary fiscal 
surpluses, switching to flexible exchange rates and reforming fiscal and financial institutions.  
Such country-led initiatives completely dominate attempts to overhaul the international financial 
architecture or launch new lending instruments, which have so far met with little success.  While 
the initial results of the countries’ initiatives have been encouraging, serious questions remain 
about the viability of the model of market-based external development finance.  Beyond crisis 
resolution, which has received attention in the form of the proposed sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanism, the international financial institutions may need to ramp up their role as providers of 
stable long-run development finance to MACs instead of exiting from them.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sovereign debt can help developing countries.  It enables their governments to facilitate 
growth take-offs by investing in a critical mass of infrastructure projects and in the social sectors 
when taxation capacity is limited, or when the alternative would be to print money and 
compromise macroeconomic stability.1  Debt also facilitates tax smoothing and counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies, essential for reducing output volatility; and it permits an equitable alignment of 
benefits and costs for long-gestation projects by shifting taxation away from current generations.   
 
This is what theory tells us.  And there is every reason to believe that governments which 
borrow and spend prudently will reap these benefits in practice. But we also know that in 
practice, there has been a profusion of costly macroeconomic crises during the 1990s with public 
debt either being a central cause, e.g., Russia 1998 and Argentina 2001, or else absorbing the 
brunt of the impact, e.g., Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand during 1997-98.  And the 
external debt crisis of the 1980s and the now-controversial financial liberalization of the early 
1990s have raised serious questions about the benefits of market-based external finance for 
developing countries with access to the international capital markets , called 'market access 
countries' or MACs.  These are the countries we look at in this paper (see Annex Table A).   
 
In the face of mounting evidence that access to the international capital markets and 
rising public debt are more likely to have enhanced vulnerability than growth, we take a closer 
look at public debt in MACs and attempt to answer three questions: 
• What are the chances of a generalized debt crisis as in the 1980s? 
• Is public debt constraining economic growth? 
• What should be done about public debt in developing countries? 
 
Governments borrow in principle to finance public goods that increase welfare and 
promote growth.  The spending has to be financed by taxation, through seignorage, or with debt.  
As Box 1 explains, there are circumstances in which sovereign debt makes sense.  The optimal 
debt literature treats debt and taxes as intertemporal substitutes with Ponzi games ruled out.2  This 
is done by constraining the present value of debt to be less than that of taxes, which excludes 
unsustainable debt paths and crises.  The optimality of debt is derived from that of taxation.3  
Where taxes are nondistortionary (viz., do not alter the incentives embedded in relative prices) 
and satisfy Ricardian equivalence (viz., only the present value of taxes matters), the level and 
path of debt are indeterminate.  When taxes are distorting (viz., change incentives and involve 
collection and enforcement costs), the path of taxes and hence that of debt matters.  In this case, 
tax rates may have to be smoothed to minimize deadweight losses, and debt is a balancing item 
subject to the present value constraint mentioned above.  If there is uncertainty, then tax rates 
may have to be smoothed over different states of nature, and debt with state-contingent payoffs 
may be needed. 
   
                                                     
1 We don’t know exactly how growth takeoffs occur; but it is reasonable to believe that a minimum amount 
of infrastructure and human capital would be necessary. 
2 An example of a Ponzi game is a government running primary deficits and rolling over debt while real 
interest rates exceed growth rates, so that the debt-to-GDP ratio grows without bound.  This is 
unsustainable and will eventually result either in a burst of inflation—the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic 
of Sargent and Wallace (1981)—or default. 
3 This is the approach in Barro (1976, 1995). 
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Growth seldom enters the picture explicitly; indeed, most theoretical models do not 
include a direct link between government debt and growth.  Long-run growth is typically taken as 
exogenous and, with insolvency ruled out, the problem becomes one of allocating taxes over time 
to minimize deadweight losses from taxation given initial debt.  However, unsustainable debt 
levels can lower growth by raising real interest rates and crowding out the private sector.  And 
sovereign debt can facilitate the achievement of growth, for example, by enabling the optimal 
social provision of public goods such as education and infrastructure when taxation capacity is 
limited today but expected to be higher in the future.  It also helps when public investments spur 
private investment through complementarities. But this critically assumes that only those public 
projects with economic returns exceeding the cost of borrowing are selected; and that the 
government subsidizes such projects when their financial return is lower than the cost of funds 
through redistributive taxation (as opposed to further borrowing): in other words, that 
governments play their assigned role. 
 
Box 1.  Why Governments Borrow 
A government can finance its spending and development efforts by borrowing, by taxing output, or by 
printing money (the so-called “inflation tax” or seignorage)1/.  Three reasons explain why public debt may 
be better than taxation: 
Tilting: Allowing a more equitable manner in which country can exploit investment opportunities with long 
gestation periods.  In a growing economy, it would be inequitable to tax current (poorer) generations to pay 
for investments that will benefit future (richer) generations. 
Smoothing: Allowing a more efficient manner for conducting counter-cyclical policies or meeting 
emergency spending needs.  Raising and lowering taxes frequently may entail efficiency losses and 
generate economic uncertainty. 
Stability: Excessive reliance on printing money could lead to high and volatile inflation, which obscures the 
information content of relative prices and hurts investment. 
But debt has eventually to be repaid—borrowing is simply postponed taxation.  Hence, the use to which 
funds are put and the returns relative to the cost of borrowing become crucial.  Computing these returns is 
not easy.  For example, if the government invests in infrastructure, the returns include not just the user fees 
but also higher future taxes if the infrastructure investments lead to faster growth.   
 
1/ Printing money is not always inflationary, as in a growing economy where real income is rising. 
 
The only explicit debt-growth theoretical link is that between external borrowing (public 
or private) and growth, the assumption being that if the marginal product of capital is higher than 
the world interest rate for developing countries, then such countries would benefit from external 
borrowing (Eaton (1993)).  But even here, external debt helps to exploit the existing growth 
potential of the country; it does not enhance it.  Theoretically, therefore, the only guideline one 
finds is that the rate of return on spending should exceed the marginal cost of borrowing on the 
assumption that debt is eventually repaid.4 
 
A more recent debate stimulated by the growth slowdown in the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) focuses on the composition of government spending.  Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003) argue that if the EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact targets of a fiscal deficit of 3 percent of 
GDP and public debt of 60 percent of GDP are achieved by cutting public investment, this would 
reduce long-run growth and eventually lead to rising fiscal deficits and debt—as observed in key 
EMU countries.  Their point is that the pact “puts no pressure on EMU members to reduce current 
government spending, so as to lower tax rates and make room for higher public investment”.  In 
                                                     
4 The economic rate of return (ROR) on some types of public spending, e.g., on power plants, is easier to 
compute than on others, e.g., education—which is not to say that the economic ROR on power plants is 
easy to compute.  
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this framework, taxes must eventually cover both government primary current spending (i.e., non-
interest spending unrelated to public investments) and the subsidy on public investment needed 
for projects where the economic rate of return (ROR) exceeds the interest rate, but the financial 
ROR does not.  In particular, the subsidy for such projects should not be financed by additional 
borrowing, which might put public debt on an unsustainable course.  The implicit assumptions are 
that there is no waste in government current spending, that borrowing is only for worthwhile 
public investment projects (economic ROR exceeds the interest rate) and that any investment 
subsidy required (difference between the interest rate and the net financial ROR) comes strictly 
from taxation. Meeting these conditions is likely to require higher public saving.  These ideas are 
applicable to the concept of ‘fiscal space’ that has been raised in the context of some MACs. 
 
Table 1 lists the top ten MACs—India, China, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, 
Russia, Argentina and Poland—in terms of public debt (external plus domestic).  In 2002, their 
combined public debt was $2.2 trillion or more than two-thirds of total MAC public debt.  These 
countries also accounted for about $1.4 trillion in external debt—that is, public plus private debt, 
held by external creditors.  When public debt is expressed as a ratio of GDP, the top eleven MAC 
debtors in 2002 were Lebanon, Jamaica, Argentina, Uruguay, Jordan, Turkey, India, Pakistan, 
Morocco, the Philippines and Indonesia, with ratios ranging between 90 and 180 percent.5  All 
but three countries had higher public debt-to-GDP ratios than a decade earlier in 1992, the year 
by which the Brady Plan resolution of the 1980s debt crisis had been implemented for the major 
participating countries.  In the three exceptions, Jamaica, Jordan and Morocco, the public debt-to-
GDP ratio was exceptionally high in 1992 and had come down only modestly by 2002.  
Interestingly, of the 17 countries in Table 1, China was the only one not to experience a debt or 
balance-of-payments crisis during the 1980s or later.6 The paper pays special attention to many of 
the countries listed in the table.  
 
Table 1. Sovereign Debt—Big MACs and Debt Majors 
 Total Public Debt ($ Billions)  Public Debt to GDP (%) 
 1992 2002   1992 2002 
India 156 380  Lebanon 70 177 
China 68 366  Jamaica 181 149 
Brazil 165 284  Argentina 26 126 
México 118 280  Uruguay 48 109 
Korea 61 232 1/  Jordan 167 100 
Turkey 65 173  Turkey 40 94 
Indonesia 56 149  India 74 81 
Russia 12 118  Pakistan 81 90 
Argentina 59 117  Morocco 102 90 
Poland 44 72  Philippines 81 89 
  Indonesia 40 86 
1/Data for 2001. 
Note:     Public debt is defined to be public and publicly guaranteed external debt plus domestic public debt.   
Source: Global Development Finance (World Bank), World Economic Outlook (IMF) and staff estimates. 
                                                     
5 There are varying definitions of the numerator and the denominator across countries.  Turkey’s debt ratios 
are reported as a share of GNP, and Brazil and Turkey both report public debt net of central bank assets. 
6 Lebanon remains an enigma.  In spite of being an outlier in its public debt-to-GDP ratio, it did not suffer a 
debt default or financial system crisis.  But its exchange rate collapsed during 1986-87 and 1992 as a result 
of domestic credit-financed expansions in government spending which depleted reserves, akin to a first 
generation crisis (see Box 3 below).  It also benefited from a pubic debt reprofiling under the auspices of 
the Paris II Conference held in November 2002 (“One-Year Progress After Paris II”, Special Report, 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Lebanon, December 2003.)   
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The next section presents a framework for examining sovereign debt and external finance 
from the perspective of vulnerability and growth.  This is followed by a discussion of the main 
factors explaining episodes of either large and abrupt increases or decreases in the public debt-to-
GDP ratio in MACs.  This feeds into answers to the three questions posed at the outset.  The last 
section concludes and questions the viability of market-based development finance. 
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2.  A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEBT AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
The analytical framework for MACs presented here surveys three strands of the 
economic literature: (i) neoclassical growth theory and its progeny, endogenous growth theory; 
(ii) an empirically-inspired literature on external capital flows; and (iii) an empirically-driven 
literature on macroeconomic crises.  The survey leads to the following main findings: 
• MACs have not proved adept at using sovereign debt, either because of weaknesses in the 
countries themselves or deficiencies in the market.  With official finance shrinking as a share 
of the total, one has to ask if reliance on external market-based sources of finance constitutes 
a viable model of development. 
• The crises of the 1980s and 1990s, even when day-to-day macroeconomic policies have been 
conservative as in many East Asian countries, have highlighted the importance of the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  This is where the chickens come home to 
roost, even if their origin is in the private sector.  Governments must be ready to play a 
shock-absorbing role, in part because of unanticipated shocks, in part because of missing 
insurance markets.  This has a corollary: the government needs a strong balance sheet and 
debt headroom. 
• Political economy factors explain much better why countries overborrow and end up in 
crises.  It is difficult to think of pure economic reasons why crises occur.  
Following the survey, we discuss conceptual links between public debt and growth, and 
alternative ways of interpreting MAC debt. 
 
2.1 Growth Theory, Capital Flows and Crises 
 
Growth Theory: Neoclassical and Endogenous  
 
 In neoclassical growth theory, e.g., the Solow-Swan model, the long-run growth rate is 
constant and is equal to the growth rate of the population or labor force under the assumptions of 
exogenously given technology, constant returns to scale and, critically, diminishing marginal 
returns to capital.  In this framework, similar countries will converge to the same steady state 
marked by zero per capita growth—because all variables grow at the same rate as population.  
The challenge is to find and adhere to the so-called “golden rule” of capital accumulation, i.e., 
find that savings rate which maximizes per capita consumption across generations.7  
 
An implication is that countries with lower capital per worker will grow faster and 
eventually converge to the same steady state as countries with higher capital per worker, the so-
called “absolute convergence hypothesis”.  As rich countries tend to have higher capital per 
worker, and therefore a lower marginal product of capital under the neoclassical assumptions, 
freeing up capital movements will lead to a mutually beneficial movement of capital from rich to 
poor countries, facilitating convergence.  This idea is expressed succinctly in Eichengreen and 
Mussa (1998). 
“The classic case for international capital mobility is well-known but worth restating. Flows from capital-
abundant to capital-scarce countries raise welfare in the sending and receiving countries alike on the 
assumption that the marginal product of capital is higher in the latter than in the former. Free capital 
movements thus permit a more efficient global allocation of savings and direct resources toward their most 
productive uses.” 
                                                     
7 For a detailed discussion, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 1.  
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 Absolute convergence has not been supported by the data, leading to the notion of 
conditional convergence, that is, once the differences in steady-states across countries are 
controlled for, poorer countries will grow faster.  Hence, one might still hold out hope that in a 
world of liberalized capital flows, capital would flow from rich to poor countries, augmenting 
their capital base and spurring growth.  However, empirical evidence is to the contrary.  Even 
though capital flows to middle income countries increased rapidly during the 1990s, “..from less 
than $40 billion per year over the period 1983-1990 to an average of about $200 billion a year” 
8during the first half of the 1990s—the lion’s share of capital flows are among rich countries, not 
from rich to developing countries.  Developing countries’ share in global private capital flows 
was just 12 percent in 1991, and fell to 8 percent by 2000 (see Figure 1). 9 
 
Figure 1.  Share of Developing Countries in Global Capital Flows 
 
 
 One explanation for this unexpected pattern of capital flows is that the assumed 
diminishing marginal returns to capital posited by neoclassical growth theory may not obtain in 
practice.  This is the core idea of endogenous growth theory, namely, that technological progress 
may be linked to capital accumulation, and that human capital should also be included, both of 
which favor rich countries.  The upshot is that the income gap between rich and poor countries 
may not narrow.  This is a simplistic statement of a complex debate about economic growth.  The 
point is that many factors, economic and non-economic, could intervene to lower returns to 
capital in poorer countries below those in richer ones, a theme that is pursued below. 
 
Higher Capital Flows: Enhanced Growth versus Enhanced Vulnerability 
 
 The observation that rich-to-poor capital flows are minor compared to those among rich 
countries has spawned a number of explanations, which are summarized in Box 2.  The 
explanations center on the idea that risk-adjusted returns in the poorer countries may actually be 
lower than those in the richer countries because of institutions, incentives and productivity. 
 
                                                     
8 Keynote address by the General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, Mr. Andrew Crockett, 
to the 33rd Seacen Governors’ Conference in Bali on 13/2/98.  
9 Global Development Finance (2001). 
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Box 2.  Why Capital Flows Diverge From Their Predicted Direction and Volumes 
 
Theory says capital should flow from capital-abundant, rich countries to capital-scarce, poor countries.  In 
practice, however, capital flows among rich countries dwarf those from rich to poor countries in volume.  
Why?  Because of factors reducing risk-adjusted returns in poor countries, the default problem, and the 
limited range of instruments available in international financial markets.  
• Risk-adjusted returns to capital in poor countries may be lower than in rich countries, contradicting the 
law of diminishing returns.  Factors such as human capital, the quality of institutions and political and 
policy predictability may operate to lower returns and raise risks notwithstanding relative capital 
capital-scarcity.1/  Practice highlights the key role of institutions, incentives and productivity. 
• Default risk, and the difficulty of securing legal redress against both foreign private and especially 
sovereign borrowers for enforcement of property rights, might also explain the home bias in lending 
and portfolio allocations of rich countries.   
• The virtual absence of debt instruments that would adjust payments to shocks stemming from the 
terms-of-trade or world interest rates might appear surprising in view of the high levels of 
sophistication in world financial markets today.  GDP-indexed bonds do not as yet exist while currency 
risk is typically borne by the borrower.  One impediment might be moral hazard stemming from the 
ability of sovereign borrowers to influence the indexation variable, although this can be overcome by 
appropriate choice of an exogenous variable.   Yet such instruments do not exist.   
 
1/  See, for example, Lucas (1988) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). 
Source: Sturzenegger and Wolf  (2004). 
 
Moreover, even the spurt of capital flows into MACs following the Brady Plan resolution 
of the 1980s debt crisis, and subsequent widespread liberalization of capital markets during the 
1990s, may not have boosted investment and growth.  Using a sample of 60 developing countries, 
one study found that, while the growing financial integration with the rest of the world has 
increased access to foreign private capital, the relationship between foreign capital and domestic 
investment has weakened, reflecting changes in the composition of inflows, offsetting outflows, 
and increased foreign currency reserve requirements.10  Another study found that a substantial 
share of the surge in capital inflows has been channeled into reserve accumulation, and that an 
equal share found its way back out of the country.  Using investment regressions, this study found 
that FDI shows the strongest link with aggregate investment, with a coefficient close to one.11   
 
A third study fails to find persuasive evidence of a “growth bonus” associated with an 
increased share of foreign saving in financing the domestic capital stock in a wide range of 
developing countries.  The evidence suggests the opposite: in a sample of 47 countries, those 
which relied more on national savings (a higher “self-financing ratio”) grew much faster 
throughout the 1990s.12  This result persists even when the impact of the quality of institutions on 
growth is allowed for. These findings are consistent with the idea that financial integration may 
have facilitated diversification of assets and liabilities, but failed to offer net new sources of 
financing capital in developing countries.13   
 
                                                     
10 Mody and Murshid (2002). 
11 Bosworth and Collins (1999). 
12 Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004).  See also Aizenman (2005), which contains a comparison of 
Korea and Chile.  
13 Based on a regression of average per capita growth rates during the 1990s on the level, square and cube 
of the average self-financing ratio and its standard deviation. 
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Two other recent, related studies are worth mentioning.  One finds that moving from 
complete financial autarky to complete financial openness would augment consumption by about 
1 percent per year or 10-20 percent of initial GDP depending upon the discount rate; the actual 
benefit would be smaller as most countries are not financially autarkic to start with.14  On the 
other hand, if a developing country were able to achieve 50 percent of the total factor productivity 
level of the USA, the effect would be of the order of 200-300 percent of initial GDP.  The 
mechanism through which financial liberalization enables this is not obvious, unless financial 
globalization results in countries becoming irrelevant for asset prices, portfolios and firm 
financial policies, the so-called “country irrelevance” proposition.  This would presumably speed 
up convergence of TFP levels and not just growth rates.  The other study argues that such 
financial globalization is limited by agency problems that arise because rulers of sovereign states 
and corporate insiders pursue their own objectives at the cost of outside investors.15 
 
Table 2. Major recipients of net international resource flows 
Country (Year of Crisis)* 
Total net resource flows 1990-
1996 Share of total flows, % 
 
US$ billion 
Share 
of 1996 GDP 
% 
Debt FDI Equity portfolio 
China 234 29 29 67 3 
México (1994/1995) 118 36 35 39 26 
Brazil (1999) 90 12 45 27 28 
Argentina (2001/2002) 71 26 45 39 16 
Korea (1997) 68 13 59 12 29 
Malaysia (1997) 63 63 18 47 35 
Indonesia (1997) 55 24 50 35 13 
Thailand (1997) 52 29 58 27 13 
India 43 11 46 16 30 
Russia (1998) 32 8 57 16 7 
Poland  26 20 6 49 4 
Chile 25 37 29 56 13 
Turkey (2000/2001) 22 12 49 23 11 
Hungary 20 45 25 68 3 
* Year(s) of macroeconomic crisis are indicated in brackets. 
Source: World Bank (2005). 
 
 Lastly, there is a high correlation among the major country recipients of capital flows 
during the 1990s and the occurrence of crises, as seen in Table 2.   
 
 
Crisis Literature: Three Generations and Counting 
 
There is a close link between the actual unfolding of macroeconomic crises with their 
growing complexity and the theoretical literature, leading so far to three generations of crisis 
models.  These are described in Box 3.  
 
                                                     
14 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2004) develop a simulation model to calculate the benefits from financial 
liberalization to a developing country in a neoclassical setting.   
15 Stulz (2005). 
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Box 3: Three Generations of Crisis Models 
 
The first generation model attributes balance of payments crises to budget deficits financed by domestic 
credit in a fixed exchange rate regime with perfect capital mobility.  This leads to current account deficits 
and a steady loss of reserves at a rate equal to the pace of credit creation; but a speculative attack resulting 
in a discrete exhaustion of remaining reserves occurs before these would have been used up based on credit 
expansion alone.  A float will then be forced.  Such macroeconomic overexpansion and overvaluation were 
the standard diagnoses of balance of payments crises in developing countries before 1993, and were the 
basis of most adjustment programs administered by the International Monetary Fund.  The international 
debt crisis of the 1980s is an example.   
 
The second generation argues that there are “crisis” and “no-crisis” multiple equilibria consistent with 
unchanged fundamentals.  This approach was inspired the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
crises of 1992--93.  The speculative attack on France in 1993 was puzzling, because the government had 
over the preceding years succeeded in attaining a level of macroeconomic discipline comparable to that of 
Germany, its partner in the ERM.  Moreover, after the bands were widened, the crisis passed without a 
substantial further depreciation of the franc, even though there had been no tightening of macroeconomic 
policy in the meantime.  How then could the fundamentals have been responsible for the earlier speculative 
pressure?  The second generation argument is most simply illustrated by a “prisoners’ dilemma.”   Consider 
two speculators. Each realizes that if the other sells, the resulting depreciation will reduce the value of his 
holdings of domestic currency. Neither wants to stand pat if the other might sell.  One equilibrium is for 
both to sell, even though the economy may be worse off after the devaluation.    
 
The third generation model was developed as an explanation of the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, where 
expansionary macroeconomic policy was not the problem, but a different kind of weakness in fundamentals 
appeared: structural distortions in the financial system combined with implicit exchange rate guarantees.   
Well-connected banks and businessmen are able to borrow in foreign currency to finance risky projects, 
including those in the non-traded sector such as real estate development or construction of new factories in 
the already-glutted steel industry.   They are aware of the risk, but reasonably confident they will be bailed 
out by the government if things go badly.  The timing of the attack again stems from the calculations of 
speculators who worry that if they wait too long, there will not be enough foreign exchange reserves to go 
around.  But there is a key difference from the first generation model, where reserves fall in the run-up to 
crisis. In this case, liabilities artificially encouraged by moral hazard rise to a point at which investors 
suddenly cash in their investments, fearful that if they wait any longer, they might not be able to get their 
money out.  The speculative attack forces the central bank to abandon the exchange rate. 
 
Source: Frankel and Wei (2004). 
 
The models have three implications for MACs: 
• First, it is difficult to predict exactly when and, equally importantly, why the next crisis will 
occur and what shape it will assume.  For example, the Lawson Doctrine posited that private 
external debt did not pose the same threat that public external debt did, presumably on the 
assumption that private-to-private flows would be better monitored and used.  But this 
doctrine was proved wrong by the East Asian crisis of 1997-98.  Similarly, how crises will be 
resolved is not clear.  The comprehensive Brady Plan response to the 1980s debt crisis has 
given way to an ad hoc country-by-country approach.  
• Second, crises of the first and third generations, which might be regarded as the most 
pertinent for (non-G-7) MACs, have highlighted the importance of the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint.  While the 1980s debt crisis, Russia 1998 and Argentina 
2001 all involved overtly expansionary macroeconomic policies and/or explicitly 
unsustainable public debt dynamics, the East Asian crisis involved large fiscal costs 
associated with financial sector bailouts.  These were contingent liabilities which became 
actual liabilities once the implicitly fixed exchange rate pegs were abandoned, leading to 
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distress in the enterprise and financial sectors as a result of their balance sheet currency 
mismatches.  Thus, it is not enough to look at fiscal deficits and explicit public debt dynamics 
(which were benign in the East Asian countries).  Contingent liabilities are also a factor.   
• Third, in view of the disappointing experience with capital flows, external debt and public 
debt over the 1980s and 1990s, economists might be forgiven for being suspicious—not 
because debt is bad, but because either MACs do not seem equipped to use it well, and/or the 
international capital market is “unforgiving”, to borrow Guillermo Calvo’s expression.  The 
literature has turned to a discussion of why debt and capital flows make countries vulnerable.  
These include debt intolerance and original sin, which are discussed in section 2.3 below.   
 
2.2   Public Debt and Economic Growth 
 
We invoke results from cross-country empirical work in three areas: macroeconomic 
factors in growth, volatility and growth, and debt and volatility.  The problems encountered in 
such work are well-known: how to control for country-specific factors, endogeneity and omitted 
variables.  Causality is hard to establish, and suitable instrumental variables are difficult to find.  
Subject to these caveats, we use results from these three areas to link public debt and growth. 
 
The first result is that growth, g, is negatively related to inflation, π , and fiscal deficits, 
FD: 
(1) ),(
)()( −−
= FDgg π . 
The second and third are from the volatility literature: growth is negatively affected by output 
volatility, σg ; and further, that σg can be decomposed into a crisis component, i.e., deep 
recessions, and one that can be attributed to normal cyclical fluctuations: 
(2) )(
)(−
= σgfg ;   
(3) normalcrisis ggg ,, σσσ +=  . 
 
The motivation for (3), as we shall see below, is that most of the damage to growth comes from 
the crisis component of volatility.  The last result is from the debt literature, which says that the 
optimal debt-to-GDP ratio (from the perspective of consumption smoothing) increases with 
volatility but goes down with sovereign risk, which itself rises with volatility, leading to an 
ambiguous link between debt and volatility: 
(4) )),(,(
)()(
*
σσ gSRgdd −+
=  
where *d stands for optimal debt and SR for sovereign (or default) risk. 
 
A simple way of thinking about the link between public debt and growth is that once the 
debt-to-GDP ratio crosses a (country-specific) threshold, it increases the chances of a crisis and 
enhances volatility, lowering growth.  Alternatively, the higher fiscal deficits are, and the more 
volatile output is (implying lower growth), the higher is the actual public debt-to-GDP ratio likely 
to be (for given inflation targets) and the lower the sustainable level of debt.  Each of these areas 
is now discussed. 
 
The macroeconomic literature argues that stability is good for growth.  Fischer (1993, p. 
487) notes that the “macroeconomic framework can be described as stable when inflation is low 
and predictable, real interest rates are appropriate, fiscal policy is stable and sustainable, the real 
exchange rate is competitive and predictable and the balance of payments is perceived as viable”. 
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His paper focused on three variables: inflation, fiscal deficits and the black market premium on 
foreign exchange, and their effects on growth in a cross-country study covering the period 1960-
88.  One finding was that a “stable macroeconomic environment, meaning a reasonably low rate 
of inflation and a small budget deficit, is conducive to sustained growth” (italics added).  On 
causality, Fischer concluded that the weight of evidence pointed to a flow from high inflation to 
low growth, rather than vice versa.  However, he also noted that low inflation is not necessary for 
growth, although high inflation is not consistent with sustained growth.16 
 
 Abstracting from the econometric problems, one may summarize Fischer’s main result as 
in equation (1) above.17  The channels through which inflation reduces growth, identified in 
Fischer (1993), include reduced investment as well as a reduced rate of productivity growth, 
while larger budget surpluses are associated with more rapid growth through greater capital 
accumulation and greater productivity growth.  Interestingly, “debt dynamics” is mentioned only 
once, though crucially, in Fischer (1993), while noting that a high deficit may be consistent with 
low inflation for a while; but that a more detailed assessment of debt dynamics may be needed to 
see if the deficit is sustainable and therefore consistent with macroeconomic stability.  This brings 
in the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (GIBC), which pulls together the fiscal 
deficit (primary fiscal balances and interest payments), inflation (seigniorage) and growth.  It also 
properly measured pulls in contingent liabilities associated with state enterprise losses, borrowing 
guarantees and poor supervision of banks, in short, the potential impact of soft budget constraints 
for banks and enterprises.  Box 4 illustrates these linkages with the stabilization experiences of 
Poland and Russia during the 1990s.   
 
Box 4: Poland and Russia: Contrasting Stabilizations 
Poland successfully stabilized between 1990 and 1999.  It initially used the nominal exchange rate as an 
anchor for the price level but abandoned its fixed peg with the dollar after 17months when competitiveness 
became an issue.  Rapid inflation reduction was never an obsession; it took eight years to attain single-digit 
inflation.  Instead, the focus was on reducing the fiscal deficit and hardening enterprise budget constraints 
while maintaining a competitive real exchange rate.  Growth rates increased and, aided by the resulting 
higher taxes and expenditure control, deficits and inflation came down gradually but credibly.   
 
The importance of microeconomic hard budgets for growth and lasting stabilization is illustrated by the 
contrasting experience of Russia between 1995 and 1998.  Russia succeeded in its quest for single-digit 
inflation by February 1998—its exchange-rate based stabilization was launched in mid-1995; but suffered a 
macroeconomic crisis six months later.  The issue turned out to be the “soft budgets” implicit in the “non-
payments” system, which mushroomed during the stabilization program of 1995-98.  The manufacturing 
sector received subsidies equal to 7-10 percent of GDP, financed by a combination of government 
borrowing and transfers (in the form of unpaid bills) from Gazprom, the gas monopoly and RAO UES, the 
electricity monopoly.  Trying to stabilize in this milieu required high real interest rates, which only prodded 
enterprises to economize even more on cash transactions and run further arrears.  The government also 
participated in this process.  More non-payments meant lower taxes and rising government debt and interest 
rates and hence poor growth, which fed on each other leading to the 1998 crisis.  
 
These experiences underline that sustainable inflation reduction ultimately depends upon keeping fiscal 
deficits and public debt dynamics under control.  This is turn depends upon adequate generation of fiscal 
revenues, which requires solid micro foundations for growth, namely, healthy enterprise and financial 
sectors based on hard budget constraints and competition.   
 
 
                                                     
16 Other notable studies include de Gregorio (1993) and Bruno and Easterly (1998), who argued famously 
that once inflation crossed 40 percent per year, growth would not be sustained . 
17 A survey of the econometric problems may be found in Temple (2000). 
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Output volatility is also known to exert a causally negative effect on long-run growth, an 
empirical result that is the basis of the volatility literature and its fundamental claim that business 
cycle volatility and the trend growth rate are not separate phenomena but causally linked.  How is 
public debt linked to output volatility?  One can think of two channels: macroeconomic 
uncertainty and its effect on investment; and the greater vulnerability to crises.  A highly indebted 
country is more likely to experience a macroeconomic crisis in the face of a terms-of-trade shock 
or a reversal of capital flows, other things being equal.  Such crises tend to be comprehensive, 
typically involving exchange rate collapses, runs on banks and sometimes, sovereign default.  
Deep recessions often follow.  This is material because when output volatility is calculated over 
long periods, it averages over periods of normal cyclical fluctuation and periods of crisis.  When 
Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004) decompose volatility into a crisis component that captures the 
effect of deep recessions and a component that captures normal cyclical fluctuations, cross-
country regressions over the period 1960-2000 show it is crisis volatility that truly harms long-run 
growth.  These results place a premium on financial, fiscal, and institutional development and the 
avoidance of crisis as key factors in alleviating the negative impact of volatility on growth.   
 
2.3 MAC Debt—Help or Hindrance? 
 
 Expressions like “debt intolerance” and “original sin” may not have found their way into 
the titles of recent papers on sovereign debt if the reforms of the 1980s and the liberalization of 
capital markets in the 1990s had led to more positive outcomes.18  The question therefore is why 
more positive results were not secured.  The following reasons come to mind: 
• Growth prospects of countries were overestimated, leading to excessive borrowing. 
• Access to debt led to procrastination by governments on necessary but difficult reforms. 
• Debt was misused, either facilitating capital flight or being invested in bad projects. 
• Available market-based debt instruments create a predisposition to crisis. 
 
In short, the literature tends to be negative on debt because MACs have appeared unable 
or unwilling to make good use of public debt, not because debt per se is bad.19  This section 
assesses three related questions: Whose fault is this? Will new instruments help? Are IFIs using a 
flawed framework for assessing how much countries should borrow?  
 
Debt Intolerance vs. Original Sin: Whose Fault is it? 
 
In examining the association of poor results with MAC debt, two polar views have 
emerged: 
• “Debt intolerance” proponents argue that it is the fault of MACs themselves, especially those 
with a history of default and high inflation and weak fiscal and financial institutions.  These 
countries cannot handle debt without becoming vulnerable to a crisis once external (public 
plus private) debt crosses 15-25 percent of GDP—a threshold much lower than actual 
external debt levels for big MACs.  As similar arguments would apply to public debt, the 
policy prescription would be to lower indebtedness. Therefore, if debt is a binding constraint 
                                                     
18 Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), and Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2002), respectively. 
IMF (2003a), chapter III, also asks whether public debt in MACs is too high.   
19 An analogy many of us may be uncomfortably familiar with: the doctor says, “Lose weight if you want to 
live longer.”  This doesn’t mean food is bad for us, only that we need to eat less. 
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on growth—ruling out the possibility of “growing out of the debt problem”—countries would 
need to either run larger primary fiscal surpluses in the hope of lowering interest rates, or face 
another round of devaluation and default.  
• “Original sin” proponents argue that it is not the fault of MACs, but their inability to borrow 
long-term in their home currency in the external markets.  This creates a currency mismatch 
which increases output volatility and vulnerability to crisis.  This mismatch would typically 
lead to a big increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the event of a real exchange rate collapse.  
The proponents further argue that the inability to issue long-term debt in the home currency is 
unrelated to domestic policies and institutions; this missing market stems instead from capital 
market imperfections, network externalities and transactions costs.  The policy 
recommendation is that the IFIs and the G-10 kick-start the market by issuing debt 
denominated in an index of emerging market currencies and then arrange swaps with MACs 
to reduce or eliminate currency mismatches.   
 
In assessing the original sin hypothesis, Goldstein and Turner (2004) agree that currency 
mismatches pose a threat, but disagree that they are exogenous to a particular country situation 
and therefore require an international solution.  Their solution is to improve domestic policies—
such as adopting flexible exchange rates to create more awareness of exchange risk, and more 
prudent macroeconomic policies more generally—and strengthen financial institutions in order to 
improve domestic financial intermediation while enabling strict oversight and control of currency 
mismatches.  There is no quick fix; a decade may be required to secure tangible and lasting 
improvements.  The main role for the IFIs would be to monitor and report currency mismatches 
in their publications, and if deemed excessive, require a reduction over the medium term as a 
condition for IMF loans.  This set of prescriptions harks back to the debt intolerance argument, 
although it presents a more optimistic view in that countries can overcome the mismatch and 
vulnerability in a reasonable time-frame. 
 
Liquidity versus Solvency: Will New Instruments Help? 
 
A recent report (IMF (2004)) reinforces the relative optimism of Goldstein and Turner.  It 
lists several MAC successes in moving from high inflation and poor sovereign debt structures to 
debt tolerance and better debt structures (i.e., more non-indexed, long-term local currency debt) 
over periods of a decade or two.  It identifies credible fiscal stabilization as a key prerequisite.  
The success stories include Chile, Israel, Mexico and Poland.  The report cautions that no amount 
of financial engineering can substitute for sound macroeconomic policies—fiscal policy in 
particular—but nevertheless argues for less risky debt instruments.   
 
One example is GDP-indexed bonds.  Interest payments would be linked to real GDP 
growth, rising when the growth rate exceeds its trend level and vice-versa. 20  The proponents 
identify three advantages: reduction in the volatility of debt/GDP ratios for debtor countries, less 
need for disruptive adjustments in the primary fiscal balance as interest payments adjust over the 
growth cycle, and diversification opportunities for global investors.  Apart from the difficulty 
associated with creating a market for a new instrument which investors might find complex, other 
practical issues include deciding who will calculate GDP growth and dealing with the potential to 
manipulate it, although incentives for the latter are diminished by the observation that politicians 
like high growth. 
 
                                                     
20 Borensztein and Mauro (2002) 
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In assessing such proposals, three sets of issues arise.  First, what problem is being 
addressed, liquidity or solvency?  Krugman (1988) noted that that “There is no such thing as a 
pure liquidity problem; it must arise because of doubts about solvency.”  It is not clear why a 
government which has achieved credible fiscal stabilization would want to issue GDP-indexed 
bonds.  It could simply go to the market if it faced a temporary liquidity crunch and repay the 
loan when times improved.  Second, for such an instrument to be effective, it would need to have 
a long enough maturity to take advantage of both up and down cycles.21  And third, to be credible, 
it might have to be issued in an up-cycle, otherwise investors might fear that governments which 
are happy to service the debt when interest rates are low might default when the up-cycle appears, 
especially if it is prolonged; they might be hard put to explain politically why they are paying 
such high interest rates on their debt.  There are thus many issues to be considered in addition to 
overcoming barriers to financial innovation. 
 
Fiscal Space vs. Crowding Out: Is the IFI Macroeconomic Framework Wrong?  
 
The ‘fiscal space’ hypothesis has grown out of the position that the design of the fiscal 
adjustment  programs in Latin American countries which suffered debt crises over the past two 
decades may have been self-defeating.  This is because public investment programs were cut to 
the bone, creating infrastructure gaps that could have hurt growth and thereby compromised the 
attainment of debt sustainability.  The idea is succinctly expressed by Calderon, Easterly and 
Servén (2004), page 133: “…fiscal adjustment through public infrastructure compression can be 
largely self-defeating in the long-run, because of its adverse effect on growth and hence on the 
debt-servicing capacity of the public sector”.  The authors fault the World Bank and IMF for 
focusing on short-run stabilization, fiscal deficits and gross public debt at the expense of long-run 
solvency defined by net debt and the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. 
 
The argument is based on the idea that while public investment in infrastructure has the 
immediate effect of raising the primary deficit, it also raises output and hence taxes while 
contributing user charges.  But the most important effect stems from raising the growth rate, 
which could happen for example if private investment and public infrastructure investment are 
complements.  Looking at the fiscal deficit captures only the immediate impact on the primary 
deficit, but focusing on the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (GIBC) captures all 
three.  The authors present evidence to show that over one third of the relative output gap 
between Latin America and the East Asian tigers over 1980-97 is attributable to the emergence of 
an infrastructure gap, though they also note that only a small part of the decline in infrastructure 
spending in Latin America can be associated with cuts in fiscal deficits, and that measures of 
infrastructure quality and efficiency are not included in arriving at this number. 
 
While it is correct to argue for a focus on the GIBC and to warn against the presumption 
that private infrastructure spending will supplant public spending, there are concerns that need to 
be addressed. The most important are factors other than infrastructure spending which also affect 
the GIBC; the role played by the market in both financing government spending and acting as an 
arbiter of debt sustainability; and political economy considerations.  Each is now discussed.   
 
An objection one might raise is that if the GIBC (quite rightly) is to be the focus of 
attention, then why not examine all its facets, including revenue mobilization—a key topic in 
many highly indebted countries—the pricing and regulation of infrastructure services, structural 
                                                     
21 Indeed, it is not obvious how one would fix the maturity of GDP-indexed bonds—they might need to be 
designed as perpetual instruments, much like equity.  
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reforms to promote growth, measures to promote creditworthiness, measures to restrict contingent 
liabilities in the financial and pension systems.  Why single out infrastructure spending?   
 
In the Easterly-Servén framework, there is no mention of the international debt markets 
and the role they play in determining the level of sustainable debt; sovereign (default) risk is 
abstracted from and the discount rate is taken as given.  But if the debt market is signaling high 
levels of default risk, then a country may have to find a way to lower indebtedness before 
ramping up infrastructure spending.  There are two reasons for doing this.  First, taking on 
additional debt for new infrastructure investments when indebtedness and default risk are high 
leaves little room for error—but infrastructure projects are both long-gestation and risky.  Second, 
a considerable amount of fiscal space can be created by improving creditworthiness and lowering 
bond spreads and interest rates, which has a direct impact on the GIBC as well as an indirect 
impact through private sector investment and growth.22   
 
The alternative would be to cut current spending and preserve infrastructure spending.  In 
assessing why this does not happen, the analysis would benefit from more attention to political 
economy.23  This could affect the GIBC and decisions on both spending composition and revenue 
in important ways.  First, if politicians have a high subjective discount rate, they may prefer to 
preserve current primary spending at the expense of infrastructure, notwithstanding the long-term 
harmful consequences for the GIBC.  They may also prefer to cut infrastructure spending than 
raise taxes or user charges.  Second, as Easterly and Servén note, the cash return on infrastructure 
investments must exceed the discount rate for government net worth to go up. The corollary is 
that cuts in infrastructure spending will actually strengthen solvency if this condition is violated.  
While it is correct that “..fiscal policy can be designed to capture a share of the high social returns 
to infrastructure spending”24, in practice infrastructure services may be mispriced, e.g., by 
providing free power for farmers and cross-subsidizing households while charging enterprises 
high prices.  Third, politics may result in the selection of innately poor projects.  The authors 
reason correctly that “It would be far better to cut just the white elephants….while preserving the 
productive new construction and maintenance projects…”  But politicians may not care about 
economic efficiency, resulting in waste which must first be eliminated before increasing 
infrastructure spending.  This brings us to political considerations.   
 
Political Economy Explanations of Sovereign Borrowing 
 
The fact that MACs experience debt crises in which solvency considerations play an 
important role suggest that governments are overborrowing, or violating their GIBC.  Since this is 
not economically rational, one has to look for other explanations.  Governments might borrow to 
postpone difficult reforms, or to promote the interests of well-connected insiders, or avoid 
making an immediately painful but eventually beneficial adjustment to an adverse shock.  Rodrik 
(1999) argues that the interactions between policies, shocks and conflict management institutions 
play a key role in explaining debt accumulation and macroeconomic performance, emphasizing 
that the tendency to avoid short-run adjustment costs might have prolonged negative 
consequences for future growth and equity.  By-and-large, governments find it difficult to adjust, 
                                                     
22 If a country’s gross public debt is 80 percent of GDP, lowering spreads by 300 basis points will save 2.4 
percent of GDP in interest payments. 
23 While the authors discuss various tricks for window-dressing the public finances, there is no guarantee 
(as the authors seem to imply) that adopting a framework based on the GIBC will diminish the appetite for 
camouflaging accounts, bad fiscal decisions and opacity.   
24 Easterly and Servén (2004): page 3. 
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with procrastination fueling debt accumulation.  Box 5 summarizes the main ideas underlying 
political economy explanations of debt dynamics. 
 
Box 5.  Political Economy and Overborrowing 
The tendency to overborrow and its sequel of financial, currency and debt crises beg the question of why 
these costly events ever take place.  The political economy approach highlights factors which lead to 
procrastination on difficult reforms, borrowing during delays caused by conflict on who will bear the costs 
of reform, and the myopic tendency to spend and borrow more in good times as a result of decision 
horizons linked to the chances of success in the next election instead of the long-run welfare of society.  
The following is a summary of the main ideas: 
• Inadequate debt management and “benign neglect”.  Ideology, lack of technical skills, human error 
or inadequate information all result in problems not being promptly addressed. Learning should help, 
but the recurrence of crises casts doubt on this view. Overborrowing may also result from “benign 
neglect”, when uncertainty about reform outcomes and the possibility that things may improve 
spontaneously lead policy maker to procrastinate on painful adjustments. 
• Conflicts among competing interest groups and strategic role of debt. The “war-of-attrition” 
viewpoint argues that competing groups struggle over how to apportion the burden of fiscal 
stabilization. The group that gives in first pays more. So both groups hold out, precipitating a larger 
crisis later on. These delays may be so costly that anticipating a crisis and implementing reforms right 
away may be better, but often only with the wisdom of hindsight.  Related studies explore the impact 
of such conflict over time depending on which group is in power. Since groups differ in their 
preferences about the composition and level of government spending, current policymakers might 
deliberately constrain the future government by issuing excessive debt today, especially if they 
consider their chances of re-election slim. Such behavior is intensified by political polarization. The 
literature concludes that economic instability is interlinked with political instability, with the two likely 
to reinforce each other. 
• Populist strategies. This strand attributes inefficient outcomes to income distribution and the role of 
median voter, whose preferences determine election outcomes and hence public policies in 
democracies. The would-be winners from policy reform may be uncertain of the gains, and therefore 
not support it. High and low income groups may form tacit coalitions favoring the accumulation of 
external debt, the former because they can avoid paying through capital flight and the latter because 
they are not expected to pay anyway. As a result, the burden is borne by the middle class. This pattern, 
associated with the populist economic strategies discussed by Dornbusch and Edwards (1991), leads to 
excessive indebtedness. 
• “Common access” to government resources. This strand of literature believes that different groups 
will prey on government resources and that cooperation will occur only after substantial deterioration 
of economic conditions. The literature has dubbed this the “voracity effect”, which leads to 
overborrowing whenever financing is available.  
• Perverse incentives and moral hazard. Consumption booms and procyclical fiscal policy may be the 
result of expectations of bailouts in the event of a crisis.  Foreign aid may foster perverse incentives for 
rent seeking, while blunting the motivation for corrective action, since success may reduce transfers. 
Empirical research in this area concludes that both aid and conditionality have worked relatively 
poorly (e.g., Kenya or Zambia in 1980s (see Dollar and Svensson, 1998)).  
• Political budget cycles. This theory was motivated by the observation that the stage of the election 
cycle affects fiscal policy.  The incumbent government tries to “buy” votes with approaching elections 
by expanding spending and shifting its composition towards observable consumption expenditure and 
away from investment. Empirical work confirms this tendency and finds that the variation in budget 
cycles is driven primarily by the desire of politicians to stay in power and the associated rents. 
 
Sources: In addition to the references cited in the box, see Talvi and Vegh (1998), Sturzenegger and Wolf 
(2004), based on Drazen (2000,) and references therein. 
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3.  FACTORS UNDERLYING CHANGES IN MAC DEBT LEVELS  
 
 We now discuss factors explaining movements in the public debt-to-GDP ratios of 
prominent MACs before answering the three questions posed at the outset.  This section is based 
on case studies for 15 “Big MACs” for which data were available (see Budina, Fiess and others, 
2004).25  These case studies document trends in domestic and external public debt; decompose the 
changes in debt-to-GDP ratios into components attributable to GDP growth, fiscal effort, 
exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations, and other factors (recognition of contingent liabilities, 
privatization, debt restructuring, etc); correlate debt dynamics with key economic policy changes; 
and extract lessons.  Of particular interest are episodes during which debt ratios increased or 
decreased by large amounts.  Table 3 provides a summary of decompositions for ten episodes of 
reductions in the public debt-to-GDP ratio ranging between 15 and 60 percentage points.  The 
numbers in bold italics identify the main factors reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio.  We see that: 
 
• All episodes involve GDP growth as one of the main contributing factors 
• 80 percent of the episodes involve significant primary surpluses; in only one episode, 
Lebanon 1991-93, were debt ratios reduced while running significant primary deficits 
• 60 percent of the episodes involve real exchange rate appreciation. 
While a real appreciation of the currency helps reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio especially when the 
share of foreign currency-denominated debt is high, this may not last if the real exchange rate 
becomes overvalued.  Russia between mid-1995 and the meltdown of 1998 is an example.  The 
debt-to-GDP ratio stayed roughly constant in spite of large primary deficits, zero or negative 
growth and high real interest rates on ruble debt.  The reason was the high initial share of dollar-
denominated debt plus the real appreciation of the ruble during the stabilization program, which 
relied on fixing the nominal exchange rate.  The real exchange rate became overvalued, and when 
it collapsed following the August 1998 crisis, the public debt-to-GDP ratio rose by a large amount 
(KPU (2001)).  Real appreciation was also a factor in the debt-to-GDP reduction over 2000-2003; 
but in this case, it was an equilibrium movement as it coincided with high oil prices, rapid growth 
and fiscal and institutional reform.      
Table 4 summarizes thirteen episodes of increases in the public debt-to-GDP ratios 
ranging between 20 and 130 percentage points.  The numbers in bold italics identify the main 
factors raising the debt-to-GDP ratio.  We see that: 
• All episodes involve real interest or exchange rate changes or both as significant factors; 
more than 75 percent of the episodes involve interest rate increases, and more than 50 percent 
involve real exchange rate devaluations 
• Over 75 percent of the episodes involve contingent liabilities or "other factors" such as 
financial sector bailouts, a major factor during the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 26 
• In more than half the cases, the countries ran primary surpluses during these debt run-ups; 
only in three cases (India, Lebanon and Korea) did countries run primary deficits 
• An important finding is that economic growth collapses did not play an important part in the 
debt-to-GDP increase episodes.27   
                                                     
25 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, México, and Jamaica in LAC, Lebanon in MNA, India and Pakistan in SAR, 
Poland, Russia, and Turkey in ECA, and Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Philippines in EAP.   
26 In Table 4, “contingent liabilities” refers to those identified as such in the data.  “Other factors” also 
includes the impact of contingent liabilities, such as bank bailouts.  In Brazil and Mexico, “debt indexation” 
of local currency debt to the exchange rate, inflation or short-run interest rates also played a role.    
27 In India, Lebanon, Pakistan and Philippines, GDP growth was a significant factor dampening the increase 
in the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
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Table 3 Main Factors Underlying Debt Reductions, 1990-2003 
Main Contributing Factors (% of GDP) Country, Time Period Total  
Change  
(% of GDP) 
Initial  
Level 
(% of GDP) 
Primary 
Balance 
GDP 
Growth 
Real Exchange 
Rate 
Real Interest 
Rate 
Privatization Other 
Factors 
Chile, 1991-1998 -30.2 42.7 –11.5 –15.6     
Indonesia, 2001-2003 -22.3 90.3 -8.3 -9.5 -4.8    
Lebanon, 1991-1993 -48.5 98.4 15.8 -33.4  -45.5  18.6 
Malaysia, 1991-1996 -41.4 91.4 -32.3 -37.3  16.5  17.8 
Mexico, 1991-1993 -22.8 50.2 -12.9 -3.9 -5.9    
Pakistan, 2000-2003 -9.5 109.1 -11.1 -16.5  14.8   
Philippines, 1994-1997 -25.3 93.5 -22.4 -15.1 -7.5 13.0  8.2 
Poland, 1992-2000 -42.8 86.7 2.1 -25.5 -9.0 -9.5 -11.7 10.8 
Russia, 2000-2003 -55.2 88.7 -16.7 -15.4 -19.3  -6.5  
Turkey, 2002-2003 -24.9 91.0 -10.3 -11.3 -8.2 8.9   
 
Based on Budina, Fiess and others (2004) 
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Table 4 Main Factors Underlying Debt Increases, 1990-2003 
 
Main Contributing Factors (% of GDP) Country, Time Period Total  
Change 
(% of GDP) 
Terminal 
Level 
(% of GDP) 
Primary 
Balance 
GDP 
Growth 
Real Exchange 
Rate 
Real Interest 
Rate 
Contingent 
Liabilities 
Debt 
Indexation 
Other 
Factors 
Argentina, 2001-2003 95.3 146.1   41.7 5.5   52.2 
Brazil, 1999-2003 16.5 58.7 -18.5 -4.1  23.7 6.5 10.8 -7.2 
India, 1997/98-2002/03 21.8 87.0 20.0 -21.2  20.0    
Indonesia, 1998-2000 70.8 94.6   8.2    64.4 
Jamaica, 1997/98-2003/04 66.8 144.8 -56.4 -6.1 7.2 51.6   70.7 
Korea, 1997-1998 31.0 43.5 4.3  4.8    20.6 
Lebanon, 1994-2003 128.1 177.9 39.4 -29.9  115.5    
Malaysia, 1997-2002 19.9 70.6 -32.0 -10.6 8.7 17.2 26.2  10.4 
México, 1994-1996 28.0 55.4 -16.8   12.5  10.9 15.7 
Pakistan, 1996-1999 19.1 113.5  -10.5 11.6 12.5   5.0 
Philippines, 1998-2002 20.9 89.1 -5.2 -11.9 12.1 10.3   15.9 
Russia, 1998-1999 34.0 88.7   40.4     
Turkey, 2000-2001 34.0 91.0 -8.5  6.4 20.4 15.4   
 
Based on Budina, Fiess and others (2004) 
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The results in Table 3 and 4 illustrate the big swings in both directions of the debt-to-
GDP ratios for individual MACs, but there is an asymmetry.  Debt levels rise suddenly and by 
large amounts following crises; achieving subsequent reductions is slow.  What these tables do 
not show is that the timing of the fiscal adjustment, i.e., a big increase in the primary fiscal 
surplus, is typically forced by the crisis itself.  The impact of the market is demonstrated by the 
large role played by the real interest rate and the real exchange rate during the debt increase 
episodes.  These often force large knock-on costs in connection with financial sector bailouts as a 
result of balance sheet currency mismatches and the impact of high real interest rates.  In contrast, 
debt reduction episodes involve growth and fiscal effort, which typically require more time to 
yield tangible benefits.  The results are similar to those found in IMF (2003).28  
 
With this background, the next three sections attempt answers to the questions posed at 
the outset: Is the world on the verge of a debt crisis? Is public debt helping or hurting growth? 
What is being done—by developing countries and by international institutions—about this?  
 
4. WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANOTHER 1980s-TYPE DEBT CRISIS? 
 
What are the risks of another generalized debt crisis as in 1982?  Our answer is “Such 
risks have receded since the late 1990s, but this doesn’t mean that such a crisis will not appear in 
the future.”  One would be at odds with history for saying otherwise—as noted in Easterly, Islam 
and Stiglitz (2000), “Crises have been a constant of market capitalism…”, including not just 
financial shocks, but also wars, pestilence and natural disasters.  One might also add that crises 
rarely tend to be similar—witness the successive generations of crisis models—making them 
difficult to predict.   
 
Nevertheless, some guidance may be extracted from recent financial contagion episodes. 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) [KRV] compare cases where an exchange rate collapse or 
sovereign default in one country led to immediate and widespread cross-border contagion with 
cases where this did not happen.  They conclude that the first set of cases is distinguished by three 
key factors: (i) a rapid build up of capital flows in the period preceding the currency collapse or 
default announcement (this is an obvious pre-requisite for a sudden stop); (ii) a surprise 
announcement of a float or default; (iii) presence of a common leveraged creditor. 
 
 These three factors certainly applied to the 1982 crisis, where petrodollars were recycled 
by the money center banks to MACs, those in Latin America in particular.  The surprise 
announcement was the Mexican default in August 1982.  The affected countries were hurt by 
commodity price declines and a big rise in US interest rates over 1980-85.  The US banks, which 
were heavily exposed to Mexico, withdrew from emerging markets, and with the exception of 
Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica, all the Latin American countries defaulted.  The wave of crises 
in MACs after Thailand announced the flotation of the baht in July 1997 was also preceded by 
substantial capital flows into the affected countries, as shown in Table 2.  The common external 
shock identified by KRV was the large depreciation of the yen against the dollar, to which most 
of the East Asian currencies were pegged, between April 1995 and April 1997.  Japanese banks 
retreated from East Asia; the Korean crisis prompted European banks to do so as well.  Likewise, 
the Russian default and devaluation of August 17, 1998, led to ripple effects in Brazil and 
eventually in Argentina, and possibly Turkey.  The Russian crisis precipitated the bailout of 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a heavily leveraged hedge fund with systemic links to 
                                                     
28 IMF (2003a), Chapter III, notes: “The rise (in public debt in MACs since the mid-1990s) appears to be 
largely accounted for by interest and exchange rate movements and the recognition of off-balance-sheet 
and contingent liabilities…” 
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large banks.29  KRV then argue that the Brazilian devaluation of January 1999, the Turkish crisis 
of late 2000 and its float of the lira in February 2001, and the Argentine meltdown and default of 
2001 did not have widespread repercussions because these crises were widely anticipated, the 
asset bubble had been pricked earlier and the common creditor was therefore less leveraged. 
 
In addition to the three factors in KRV, the crises of the 1990s have highlighted two 
more.  The first is to do with the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  The second is to 
with balance sheet mismatches among banks and enterprises, which has been an amplifying 
factor.  Regarding the first, it is difficult to think of a crisis among MACs in the last two decades 
which has not involved the GIBC either ex ante or at ex post.  Argentina and Russia have been at 
one extreme with adverse public debt dynamics in the lead up to the crisis in the context of a 
fixed exchange rate, while in the East Asian case, the big fiscal impact came ex post from the bail 
out of financial sector institutions.  In the case of Russia, financial sector linkages with the real 
sector were small, as were balance sheet currency and maturity mismatches compared to those in 
East Asia and Argentina.  Argentina’s situation was further complicated by the transition costs of 
its pension reform.  These raised fiscal deficits at a time of considerable vulnerability stemming 
from financial sector fragility and an overvalued real exchange rate that was difficult to address 
because of the hard peg to the dollar.30 
 
The point going forward is that even if the next crisis assumes a completely unexpected 
shape, it would in some way affect the GIBC—even though the manner may be subtle, for 
example, as a result of hidden liabilities as opposed to visibly large primary deficits and a large 
interest rate-growth rate differential; and have an adverse impact on the real and financial sectors; 
there is not much else a crisis can do.  It is therefore heartening that countries are taking steps to 
address key sources of vulnerability, including running larger primary fiscal surpluses, building 
up foreign exchange reserves and shifting towards domestic currency debt.  Some of these issues 
are discussed in more detail below for countries which went through a serious crisis in the 1980s 
or 1990s or both.  Three questions are addressed: (i) Are public debt levels sustainable? (ii) What 
are countries doing to lower vulnerability? and (iii) What does the market say? 
 
4.1  Are MAC Public Debt Levels Sustainable? 
Public debt-to-GDP ratios for the major MACs rose significantly after the mid-1990s.  
The experience of the East Asian countries, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, suggest 
that this alone does not mean that debt levels are unsustainable.  Table 5 shows the abrupt and  
sizable jump in public debt in these countries following the 1997-98 crisis, mainly as a result of 
issuing government bonds to recapitalize banks.  Subsequently, net foreign assets have been built 
up and international liquidity considerably strengthened, with the ratio of short-term external debt 
to reserves falling much below one.  All the economies have been growing for the last five years 
and in most cases the expectation is that in coming years they will achieve growth of 5 percent a 
year or more.  All have been addressing the structural distortions in the corporate and financial 
sectors, which, combined with implicit exchange rate guarantees and the bailouts of well-
connected business groups, led to the crisis in the first place.  A reasonable assertion is that if a 
similar crisis recurs, public debt might well be pushed to unsustainable levels; the institutional 
and structural reforms being undertaken seek to prevent such an eventuality.  In contrast, the 
Philippines also experienced rising public debt, not because of bank recapitalization, but because 
                                                     
29 For a discussion of the bail out of LTCM, see Rubin and Weisberg  (2003), pp. 284-288. 
30 Perry and Serven (2003) attribute much of the observed deterioration in the Argentine fiscal accounts 
over 1994-2001 to the widening of the social security system’s deficit following pension reforms in 1994. 
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of rising off-budget liabilities and an increase in the fiscal deficit due to a falloff in tax revenues.  
Here, fiscal consolidation is a clear priority. 
Table 5. Key Macroeconomic Variables in the East Asian Crisis Countries, 1996-2002 
 
         
  Total Public Debt 
% of GDP 
 Net Foreign Assets 
% of GDP 
 Short-term External Debt 
% of Reserves 
 1995-1997 1998 2002 1995-1997 1998 2002 1995-1997 1998 2002 
          
Korea 12.8 43.0 42.4  4.6 10.4 19.4 200.7  54.1 34.131  
Malaysia 46.7 57.2 62.8 20.0 30.2 35.4   47.8  33.1 24.46 
Indonesia 34.5 94.0 91.3  9.5 11.8 15.2 188.1  88.6 75.26 
Thailand 21.2 57.7 45.3 -3.5   1.5 31.1 131.2 102.9 31.33  
1/ Number for 2002 is not available, 2001 used instead 
Notes:    Net foreign assets are the sum of foreign assets held by monetary authorities and deposit money 
banks, less their foreign liabilities. Short-term external debt is debt that has an original maturity of 
one year or less.  Reserves are total reserves minus gold 
Source:  Staff estimates, Global Development Finance, various issues. 
 
 
In addition to the level of debt, the dynamics, as determined by the interactions among 
the primary fiscal balances, real interest rates and real growth rates, also matter.  Apart from the 
East Asian countries, the other prominent crisis countries of the mid-1990s—which also 
experienced an increase in debt by the end of the decade—were all engaged in a stabilization 
program.  This list includes Argentina, Brazil, Russia and Turkey.   
 
In all four cases, the nominal exchange rate served as the anchor, and the real exchange 
rate became overvalued.  In varying degree, these countries faced similar situations.  By pegging 
their exchange rates in the presence of open capital accounts in order to bring inflation down from 
high levels, these countries were subject to the macroeconomic policy ‘trilemma’,31 and opted to 
choose the first two of the following three goals: (i) use exchange rate as an instrument for price 
stability; (ii) keep capital account open for efficiency and flexibility; and (iii) pursue an activist 
monetary (interest rate) policy.  But they were also subject at some point during the 1990s to the 
problem of unsustainable public debt dynamics and a sudden stop in capital flows– creating an 
impossible ‘quadrilemma’.   Fiscal reforms were incomplete or not credible or else fiscal policy 
was procyclical, as in Argentina.  In such circumstances, enterprises might prefer to borrow 
offshore in view of pegged exchange rates combined with domestic interest rates exceeding 
foreign interest rates.  If they are in the non-traded sector, e.g., real estate, this creates a currency 
mismatch and a potential vulnerability.  If the size of this mismatch grows sufficiently large, 
borrowers might come to expect that losses would be nationalized should the exchange rate peg 
be abandoned, thus creating a moral hazard problem.   
 
The preceding configuration created an exposure to a ‘sudden stop’ in capital flows, 
forcing the countries to raise interest rates in order to keep domestic currency government debt 
attractive.  This worsened debt dynamics, with balance sheet mismatches reducing policy options 
further, as devaluation would trigger bankruptcies in the financial and corporate sector.  Once 
                                                     
31 The trilemma, first articulated by Obstfeld and Taylor (1998), asserts that an open economy can choose 
only two out of the three goals listed in the text. 
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countries get into this kind of situation, there seem to be only two ways out: restructure debt to 
lower its present value, as Argentina has been attempting to do; or adopt flexible exchange rates 
and run exceptionally large primary fiscal surpluses as Brazil and Turkey have been doing over 
the past few years.  
 
Table 6.  Economic Indicators Before and After Crisis in Four Big MACs 
 
 
Table 6 captures the nature of the post-crisis adjustment in these countries by presenting 
averages of key variables for the three years before and three years after the crisis.  Apart from 
Argentina, primary fiscal surpluses have been significantly ramped up and interest payments have 
risen from already high levels, except for Russia, which successfully restructured its debt.  Net 
resource transfers shrank significantly in all the countries after the crisis; only in the case of 
Russia, which elected to prepay debt when oil prices rose, and which benefited from a significant 
write-down on London Club debt, was this by design.  The post-crisis bilateral US dollar real 
exchange rate has depreciated significantly; Turkey is an exception in that by the end of the 
“after” period, the real exchange rate had reverted to its pre-crisis level.   
 
The key issues in Brazil and Turkey are whether international interest rates will remain 
low and whether the market will be convinced by these countries’ persistent primary surpluses 
and lower their sovereign bond spreads.  In Turkey, the return of the real exchange rate to its pre-
crisis level raises a question about the sustainability of its high post-crisis growth rate, unless 
microeconomic efficiency and productivity have risen.  Moreover, interest payments in both 
countries remain in excess of even the ramped-up primary surpluses, so that an overall fiscal 
deficit exists that needs to be financed by additional debt issue.  And to the extent that primary 
surpluses have been achieved by cutting public investment and social spending, this could have 
negative consequences for long-run growth.32  It would be reasonable to assert on this basis that 
debt continues to be at unsustainable levels and needs to be reduced.  Box 6 illustrates, with 
Brazil’s experience, the challenges of public debt management when debt crosses thresholds 
deemed unsustainable by the market.  
 
Box 6.  Lessons From Brazil’s Macroeconomic Adjustment 1999-2003 
Brazil’s high primary surpluses since 1999, the year in which it also switched from a crawling peg to a 
flexible exchanger rate regime, have been both surprising and controversial; surprising because the market, 
judging by the default-level bond spreads in 2002, did not expect the new administration elected that year 
                                                     
32 This is the fiscal space argument made above, and critically assumes that the cash return on infrastructure 
investment exceeds the marginal cost of borrowed funds; and that fiscal waste is nonexistent. 
Net Resource Transfers
 % of GDP  % of GDP US$ bln 1st year = 100
before after before after before after before after
Argentina 0.1 0.8 3.4 7.3 7.0 -8.1 97.5 57.5
Brazil 0.5 3.8 7.0 8.1 19.4 4.7 89.2 54.8
Russia -3.2 4.6 5.0 3.8 6.3 -3.6 111.0 72.4
Turkey 0.1 5.2 18.7 19.8 2.8 -0.4 98.1 84.9
Notes:  1. Real exchange rate is bilateral with respect to US$, period average
            2. Argentina: before 1998-2000, after 2001-2003; Brazil: before 1996-1999, after 2000-2003;
                Russia: before 1995-1998, after 1999-2002; Turkey: GNP is used, instead; before 1998-2000, after 2001-2003.
            3. Net resource transfers are calculated as a net resource flows minus interest on long-term debtand profit remittances on FDI
                Data are not available for 2003
Source: Staff estimates, Global Development Finance, various issues
Primary Surplus Interest Payment Real Exchange Rate
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to persevere with these, and controversial because of concerns about long-run growth and welfare based on 
‘fiscal space’.  While there has been some good news in terms  of rising growth and private investment in 
recent months, the EMBI Global spread on March 11, 2005, while much lower at 388 basis points than a 
year ago, is still much higher than in Chile (58 bps) and Mexico (156 bps).  While it is too early assess the 
long-run impacts, this box summarizes key points from Brazil’s experience over 1999-2003. 
 Shift towards domestic debt--does it help?  By end-2003, net public debt had reached 58 percent of GDP 
compared to 49 percent in 2000.  At the margin, new public borrowing has been largely in the domestic 
market: the rise in the ratio of external debt to GDP is due mainly to the large devaluations in 1999 and 
2002.  This shift towards domestic borrowing has not by itself helped debt sustainability because domestic 
debt has tended to be indexed either to short-run interest rates, the exchange rate or the price level.  Thus, 
the proportion of nominal (unindexed) bonds fell from 60 percent in 1996 (when credibility following the 
successful stabilization in 1994 was high) to less than 3 percent in 2002 as a result of economic and 
political uncertainty.   
Contingent liabilities and exchange rate losses.  Domestic public debt growth has been driven not just by 
the fiscal deficit but also by the recognition of contingent liabilities, financial sector bailouts, the 
restructuring of subnational debt and indexation.  Without contingent liabilities and at 1999 nominal 
exchange rates, net public debt to GDP would have been 37 percent instead of 58 percent in 2003 even 
excluding privatization. However, interest rate and exchange rate dynamics would have been much worse 
without the fiscal adjustment implemented in 1999. 
 
Fiscal effort is the key.  The crucial policy response has been the raising of the primary surplus, which has 
been at least 3 percent of GDP since 1999.  The revenue ratio reached 35 percent of GDP in 2003, 10 
percentage points higher than 10 years earlier.  But high interest payments and the exchange rate losses on 
external debt have kept the fiscal deficit at least as high as 8 percent of GDP since 1999.  With the shift 
towards domestic debt not having tangibly helped debt dynamics so far, it is safe to say that Brazil would 
have been in a worse situation without its fiscal effort.  Of course, higher primary fiscal surpluses alone are 
not enough; how to increase public savings by eliminating waste and how to better align spending 
composition with growth objectives remain key topics. 
 
Moral hazard.  Private, non- guaranteed debt rose by US$59 billion over 1997-98 (about 7 percent of GDP 
at the time) as a result of high domestic interest rates, the high fiscal deficit and a quasi-fixed exchange 
rate.  This created a problem, especially in 2002, when the domestic political situation led to difficulties of 
debt rollover. However, the authorities refused to accept responsibility for servicing this debt, letting the 
exchange rate float and relying on private debtors and creditors to work out their own arrangements.  
Fortunately, Brazilian corporates were not highly leveraged, unlike their counterparts in Asia at the time of 
the 1997-98 crisis.  The domestic banking system also proved resilient, partly because it had undergone a 
major restructuring prior to the 1998-99 crisis, and there were no bankruptcies.  
    
Principal lessons.  The first lesson is that financial engineering, be it a shift towards domestic debt or 
indexation, is secondary to fiscal adjustment.  By itself, it could even backfire, as Russia’s GKO-Eurobond 
swap of July 1998 or Argentina’s mega-swap of June 2001, showed.1/  Second, the Brazilian experience 
lends support to the debt intolerance argument and weakens the original sin hypothesis discussed above in 
section 2.3, because if a country cannot issue even domestic debt unindexed and in long maturities in 
domestic currency, it would be unreasonable to expect nonresidents to hold such debt.  Third, the major 
challenges MACs need to prepare for include dealing with domestic moral hazard and private external debt, 
balance sheet mismatches and contingent liabilities.     
 
Conclusion: For MACs with debt sustainability problems and which rule out default, the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint is most likely to be helped by fiscal effort, flexible exchange rates (to 
weaken incentives for currency mismatches), and institutional reform.  
 
1/Aizenman, Kletzer and Pinto (2005). 
Based on a note contributed by Gautam Datta.  
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4.2  What Are Countries Doing to Lower Vulnerability? 
 
Vulnerable countries such as Brazil, Turkey and Jamaica are running primary fiscal 
surpluses of unprecedented magnitude—and these have persisted for lengths of time that would 
have been considered politically impossible only a few years ago.  This “revealed policy 
preference” may be the outcome of a realization that debt levels are too high and are hurting 
development; and that repeated defaults and restructurings are too costly in a long-term 
development sense.  But we cannot rule out the influence of the extended period of historically 
low international interest rates following 9/11/2001 in deciding to pursue such a course.  A last 
factor is that the relative roles of the government and private sector have been changing in a way 
that might be consistent with lower public debt-to-GDP ratios.   
 
At the same time, affected countries have raised their reserves relative to short-term 
external debt, thereby lowering vulnerability to shifting market sentiment.  These two 
responses—running large primary surpluses to dampen the upward trajectory of debt, and 
bolstering international liquidity—reduce exposure to the mix of unsustainable debt dynamics 
and vanishing international liquidity that were at the heart of the crises these countries suffered 
during the 1990s.  In addition, the widespread adoption of flexible exchange rates and more 
conservative macroeconomic policies are a marked departure from the fixed exchange rates and 
expansionary macroeconomic policies of the 1980s.  
 
One more point is noteworthy: a shift towards domestic currency debt in many of the 
major countries experiencing a crisis during the 1990s, including India and Brazil.  Whether or 
not this lowers vulnerability depends upon whether it is accompanied by actions that strengthen 
the government’s solvency, for example, through the generation of higher primary fiscal 
surpluses achieved through expenditure and revenue reform as opposed to the political expedient 
of cutting public infrastructure investment;33 and whether or not capital account convertibility 
exists.  Box 6 discussed this issue in the Brazilian context. 
 
4.3  What Does the Market Say? 
No matter the flaws of the market—and allegations of these are numerous, including 
myopia, greed, herding behavior and excessive risk-taking driven by moral hazard—it remains 
the ultimate arbiter of MAC debt destiny.  Markets today are different today from the 1980s.  The 
large money center banks have been largely replaced by emerging market bond markets.  
Sovereign external debt is held in diversified portfolios; moreover, even the nature of the investor 
base for MAC debt has changed in a way that could lead to greater stability.34  There is greater 
awareness of individual country fundamentals, with more information readily available. 
The incentives are also different on two counts: during the 1980s, at the political level, 
the fears of a systemic international financial crisis—because of the concentration of the debt in a 
few large money center banks—played a decisive role in galvanizing high-level support in the 
creditor countries for a resolution.35  In spite of the high-level coordination facilitated by country 
debts being concentrated in a few large banks under the umbrella of the Baker and Brady Plans, 
                                                     
33 But recall the caveat that public infrastructure investment is often a money-losing proposition for 
political reasons. 
34 Global Development Finance (2005). 
35 The exposure of U.S. money center banks to countries restructuring debt was 215 percent of banks’ 
capital and 260 percent of their equity at end-1982; that of UK and Canadian banks was 275 percent and 
195 percent of their respective equity;  Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2004). 
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the resolution and workouts took several years.  More recently, expectations that Russia or 
Argentina would be bailed out were proven wrong.  As individual investors have incurred or will 
incur substantial losses, the moral hazard problem associated with expected bailouts should 
diminish.  All this means that debt problems are likely to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, 
with the onus for resolution falling on the countries themselves. 
 
A last critical consideration for MACs is how the market perceives the sustainability of 
their debt levels, which can be inferred from the EMBI Global spread for a particular country.36  
This spread is an index of default risk relative to advanced benchmark countries, typically the 
USA, and is usually computed as the arithmetic difference between the yield on the MAC bond 
and that on a bond of comparable maturity in the benchmark country.37  In general, a lower EMBI 
spread can be interpreted as connoting a reduced default probability, although this is not 
automatically the case.  This is because a lower spread can be the result, for example, of the 
benchmark yield’s going down sharply (the case in recent years) even if the probability of default 
and default recovery value as assessed by the market do not change.  Likewise, a drop in spreads 
can also occur if the benchmark yield goes down while assumed default recovery value goes up 
with an unchanged probability of default.38  In order to deal with this ambiguity, the figures 
below report spreads for selected countries which experienced a crisis during 1990s together with 
the corporate high-yield (“junk bond”) spread. 
 
Figure 2 contains the EMBI global spreads for Brazil, Turkey, Chile, and developed 
country high-yield debt, or junk bonds, for the period 1996-2003.  For much of the time, Brazil’s 
EMBI spread was above the junk bond spread, and significantly so during crisis periods, such as 
during the Russian crisis and its aftermath, and the confidence crisis that erupted in May 2002 in 
connection with the Presidential elections.  It is therefore encouraging that by the end of the 
period shown in Figure 2, Brazilian spreads had dropped to the level of the junk bond spread.  In 
contrast, Turkey’s EMBI spread has hovered near the junk bond spread and has been much less 
volatile than that of Brazil, while Chile’s has been consistently lower and on a declining trend.  
Figure 3 shows the spreads for selected East Asian countries.  While spreads for Korea, Malaysia 
and Thailand jumped to exceed the junk bond spread during the 1997-98 crisis period, these 
dropped to substantially lower levels by mid-1999 and have been on a downtrend since.  The 
Philippines is an exception.  Its spread is close to the junk bond spread.  Overall, therefore, the 
picture on spreads is mixed.  Chile, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand have clearly strengthened 
creditworthiness, but Brazil, Turkey and the Philippines are vulnerable, although the trends for 
Brazil and Turkey are more encouraging. 
 
To conclude, the initiatives being taken by indebted countries, the changed nature of the 
markets and incentives, and the signals embedded in EMBI spreads all suggest that the risks of a 
generalized debt crisis in MACs have receded since the late 1990s. 
                                                     
36 JP Morgan’s EMBI Global is regarded as the most comprehensive MAC debt index.  It was introduced in 
1999.  The EMBI spread is a weighted average of the spreads of US dollar bonds issued by a particular 
MAC.  For details, see JP Morgan (1999). 
37 It is sometimes analytically more convenient to compute the spread  geometrically. Thus, letting s denote 
the spread, Y the bond yield in the MAC and y that in the benchmark country, the spread is defined 
implicitly by: (1+s)(1+y)=1+Y.  However, the convention is to report the spread simply as Y-y. 
38 It is easy to construct numerical examples under risk neutrality to show this.  All we observe is the price 
of the bond and its spread; the probability of default and implied recovery value must be extracted.  A 
complete discussion is contained in Merrick (2004). 
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Figure 2. EMBI Spreads for Brazil, Chile, and Turkey, 1996-2003 
 
Note: Spreads on developed-country high risk is an average for the global junk bond market 
Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan Chase, and GDF, World Bank 
 
Figure 3.  EMBI Spreads for Selected East Asian Countries, 1997-2003 
Note: Spreads on developed-country high risk is an average for the global junk bond market 
Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan Chase, and GDF, World Bank 
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5.  IS PUBLIC DEBT CONSTRAINING GROWTH? 
 
Public debt can constrain growth in MACs (and indeed in other countries) through three 
channels:39 
• “Debt Overhang”: In a highly indebted economy, since private investors expect that future 
output will in effect be taxed to repay the debt, the expected return to private investment is 
reduced; hence investment and growth fall.40  Private investment may also be discouraged by 
the macroeconomic uncertainty and unpredictable taxation engendered by high debt.41 And 
the incentives for governments to carry out policy reform may be lower since successful 
reforms would result in greater pressure to repay creditors.42   
• “Fiscal Space”: High debt service results in pressures on the government budget and may 
reduce public investment and social spending, in turn reducing economic growth. 
• “Crowding Out”:  The financing of high fiscal deficits could raise real interest rates and 
dampen, or crowd out, private investment as lenders may prefer to hold relatively safe and 
high-yielding government paper.  Where capital controls do not exist, private borrowers 
crowded out of the domestic market may tap the overseas market; but are unlikely to invest in 
real assets so long as government debt yields high returns. 
 
Based on the evidence available, public debt appears to be constraining growth in a 
number of prominent MACs, most obviously in those that are experiencing debt sustainability 
problems.  A debt sustainability problem means that the present combination of primary 
surpluses, real interest and growth rates is no longer tenable.  It could also be a sign of solvency 
problems, i.e., that creditors believe that the present value of surpluses is less than the outstanding 
public debt.  This in turn could mean that the country is not expected to grow out of its debt 
problem—otherwise, there would not be a sustainability issue to begin with—and generate 
uncertainty about future inflation and taxation with harmful effects on investment and 
productivity through channels similar to those discussed in the macroeconomics-growth literature 
in section 2.2 above.  By this yardstick, public debt is constraining growth in countries like 
Argentina, Brazil, Jamaica, Lebanon and Turkey. 
 
Further, any MAC which is debt intolerant and faces high spreads on its sovereign 
borrowing should also be regarded as being in a situation where public debt is constraining 
growth.  MACs tend to be more volatile than their industrialized counterparts.  Catão and Kapur 
(2004) find that once the volatility of output or the terms of trade is included in logit regressions 
of default probability in a cross-country panel, the credit history variable of Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003) is no longer significant.  This means that credit history is to some extent a 
substitute for volatility, which translates into debt distress: a one percentage point increase in 
volatility in real GDP leads to a 12 percent decline in the sustainable debt threshold.  
Paradoxically, countries that most need debt finance for smoothing are the ones that can least 
tolerate it.  This also raises the puzzle why countries and their creditors continue to underestimate 
the levels of volatility, or to overestimate their own capacity to service debt in its presence.  
                                                     
39 We rule out the trivial case where debt constrains growth in the sense that writing off debt will improve 
growth prospects because it ignores what was done with the debt and how this influences growth past and 
future compared to a situation of zero debt. 
40 The classic papers on the debt overhang are Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989).  
41 Serven (1997). 
42 Corden (1989). 
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While it is reasonable that unanticipated shocks, if severe enough, can derail development efforts 
in even the most fiscally responsible countries, it is harder to justify repeated episodes of debt 
distress.  If volatility is a fact of life for many of these countries, these shocks cannot any longer 
be viewed as surprises; and the countries need to build up a buffer in terms of debt headroom for 
unanticipated shocks. 
 
Public debt could also be a constraint to growth and development in countries like India.  
This claim may appear surprising in view of India’s stellar growth track record and the absence of 
macroeconomic vulnerability.  But as argued in World Bank (2003), beyond a point, public debt 
becomes a constraint on the composition of government spending as interest payments consume a 
growing fraction of revenues.  It could also constrain financial sector reform and development—
because the government is reliant on a captive financial system to buy its debt—thereby affecting 
resource allocation; and reduce private investment to the extent that it exploits complementarities 
with public investment.    
 
Box 7.  India: High Deficits, Debt and Reserves—But High Growth? 
 
India’s growth performance during the 1980s and 1990s was exceeded by only a handful of countries; so 
was the size of its fiscal deficits.  But it is not vulnerable to a repeat of its 1991 fiscal and balance-of-
payments (BOP) crisis because of the build up of foreign exchange reserves, capital controls, a flexible 
exchange rate system and widespread public ownership of banks. Nevertheless, a fiscal adjustment is 
needed to bolster the chances of sustained high growth over the long-run.1/  Spending composition has 
deteriorated as a result of an inefficient fiscal adjustment during the ten years following the 1991 BOP 
crisis.  Table 7 presents changes in key fiscal variables for the general government over the Eighth Plan 
(1992/93 to 1996/97) and Ninth Plan periods to illustrate this.  
 
Table 7: Fiscal Adjustment Dynamics, 1985/86-2001/02 
(based on period averages) 
 
% of GDP 8th Plan (92/93-96/97)  
versus 
85/86-89/90 
9th Plan (97/98-01/02)  
versus 
8th Plan 
Revenues -1.5 -0.9 
Primary deficit -3.2 +1.4 
Debt +8.0 +0.0 
Interest  +1.3 +0.7 
Capital expenditure -2.8 -0.4 
Fiscal deficit -1.8 +2.1 
 
During the Eighth Plan period, revenues fell and interest payments rose relative to the pre-crisis period, 
1985/86-1989/90, ‘compensated’ by a big reduction in capital expenditure.  This happened even though 
growth was at its highest level over the past two decades and the primary deficit was reduced substantially.  
The fall in revenues and rise in interest rates both stemmed from reforms—cuts in customs and excise duty 
rates to stimulate efficiency, and a reduction in domestic financial repression.   The net result was that 
capital expenditure fell by over 3 percentage points of GDP by the Ninth Plan period.  And the sum of 
interest, administration and pensions rose by 3 percentage points of GDP and a huge 22 percentage points 
of revenue while developmental spending on health and education stagnated and that on irrigation, power 
and transport declined (not shown in table). 
 
Crisis proofing by accumulating foreign exchange reserves and switching towards long-term rupee debt for 
deficit funding in this milieu meant high real interest rates for the private sector for much of the second half 
of the 1990s.  The key to reversing the fiscal slide and eventually raising public savings to a level 
consistent with Tenth Plan macroeconomic targets is to mobilize revenue by completing direct and indirect 
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tax reforms; and altering the composition of spending by reducing and redirecting subsidies towards rural 
infrastructure and agricultural R&E—most of the poor live in rural areas.  Power sector reform is also 
important for fiscal reasons, and to help manufacturing, the most tax-buoyant sectors in the economy.  
 
General government grew from less than 60 percent of GDP in 1985/86 to 87 percent by 2002/03, not 
including debt of central public enterprises and guarantees.  This risks an uncontrolled upward trajectory if 
interest rates rise and growth slows down. This is a good time to begin implementing a phased reform given 
high reserves and currently low interest rates.  The Ministry of Finance’s Economic Survey 2003-03 
(released July 7, 2004), notes the seriousness of the situation: “Growing deficits and public debt and the 
concomitant declining share of the private sector in total credit have been preventing the economy from 
realizing its growth potential.  The unobserved cost of fiscal deterioration is the growth forgone.” The 
challenge is to implement the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act of 2003, which mandates 
the central government to eliminate its revenue deficit by 2008, i.e., raise public savings;2/ reform the 
borrowing regime for states; expand center-to-state transfers linked to reform and performance; and 
simplify expenditure management—in short, to strengthen fiscal institutions and improve the quality of the 
fiscal stance. 
 
1/ The growth rate was over 8 percent in 2003-04; but this after 4 percent growth the previous year.  The trend rate of 
growth is closer to 6 percent—below the 8 percent target mandated for the Tenth Plan (2002-03 to 2006-07). 
2/ The revenue deficit is the difference between total revenues and current spending.  Eliminating it is tantamount to 
requiring that borrowing be used only for public investment. 
 
Source: World Bank (2003) and Pinto and Zahir (2004). 
 
 The issue of causation remains.  Does high public debt cause low growth, or is it a 
cumulative symptom of bad past decisions on spending and taxation, misuse of fiscal resources, 
poorly designed stabilization programs and the postponed consequences of contingent liabilities?  
Omitted variables can also be an explanation, e.g., a supply shock could both lead to lower 
growth and a higher public debt-to-GDP ratio.  And weak institutions could likewise lead to low 
growth and high indebtedness. 43 
 
A pragmatic view is that once a country crosses a certain debt-to-GDP threshold, debt 
could easily become a dominant factor going forward as well as the biggest constraint on policies 
and growth; how it was accumulated becomes secondary and dealing with the indebtedness itself 
becomes a primary task. 44  And countries which choose to generate large primary surpluses in 
pursuit of debt tolerance can do so convincingly only if these efforts are accompanied by 
institutional reform, as noted in Box 8 on Turkey’s reforms.  The good news is that policies and 
institutions in MACs may mature over time; but the process is time consuming, and prone to 
setbacks.  Some setbacks may be welfare-enhancing, forcing fundamental institutional, political 
and social reform.  For example, Mexico in the early 1990s and Korea in the mid-1990s followed 
policies that turned out to be unsustainable.  Both countries ended with a crisis and deep 
recessions, but experienced quick rebounds with output exhibiting a V-shaped path.  This pattern 
of recovery has been facilitated by adopting greater exchange rate flexibility, relying on export 
orientation, and the beginning of major internal restructuring.  The process has induced important 
political economy changes, reducing the ability of incumbents—political or business elites—to 
                                                     
43 Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaichoren (2003) stress the primacy of institutions by arguing that 
crises are caused by bad macroeconomic policies, which increase volatility and lower growth; but bad 
macro policies in turn are the product of weak institutions.  In order to avoid problems with endogeneity 
and omitted variables, they develop a technique to isolate the “historically determined component of 
institutions” based on the colonization strategy pursed by European settlers, and show that this is the 
critical factor in explaining volatility, crises, and growth. 
44 Fiscal dominance associated with high sovereign risk and unsustainable public debt dynamics for 
example becomes a severe constraint on monetary policy and the achievement of inflations targets, as 
argued in Blanchard (2004). 
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block reforms.  IMF (2004) gives examples of countries which are moving towards debt tolerance 
in spite of “bad” histories, including Chile, Israel, Mexico and Poland.   
 
Box 8.  Turkey—Strengthening Institutions for Fiscal Management 
Turkey’s volatile economic performance in the 1990s may be attributed in part to its coalition politics, 
which were compounded by weaknesses in the institutional arrangements for aggregate fiscal management.  
The seeming inability of a number of governments to restrain fiscal commitments within a sustainable 
policy framework created a credibility problem with domestic and international debt markets.   
 
The weaknesses included (a) a non-comprehensive budget and lack of transparency in fiscal reporting, (b) 
fragmented responsibility and poor coordination of fiscal management among the three central agencies of 
government (Finance, Planning and Treasury), and (c) a failure to control and to incorporate the effect on 
fiscal risk of quasi-fiscal policies and guarantees which created unrecorded “hidden” liabilities, both 
explicit and contingent.  Differences in the perspectives of coalition partners exacerbated these problems.  
 
As a result, fiscal risk was underestimated.  In 1999, the reported consolidated central government budget 
suggested expenditure equivalent to 36 percent of GDP, but a comprehensive assessment would have 
revealed general government expenditure closer to 46 percent of GDP.  Including the costs of quasi-fiscal 
policies, such as directed credit programs, would have increased this further.  For much of the period up to 
1999, such costs were disguised as growing liabilities of the government to the banking sector (the so-
called duty losses) that were not explicitly recognized.  While estimates of these costs vary, in 1999, the 
public sector’s financing requirement (including the costs of quasi-fiscal programs) of almost 24 percent of 
GDP was double the reported consolidated budget deficit of 12 percent.      
 
The government has taken steps to address these institutional weaknesses.  The Public Finance 
Management and Control (PFMC) Law that was passed by Parliament in December 2003 puts in place a 
comprehensive fiscal framework encompassing the general government.  The new law sharply reduces the 
scope for extra-budgetary and revolving funds, which are being eliminated or integrated into the budget.  
Explicit appropriations are provided to compensate for “duty” obligations of state enterprises and banks 
and that this is now accounted for in the budget. Thus while quasi-fiscal policies still exist, their costs are 
now provided for in the budget. Longer term reforms that will modernize the financial control 
arrangements and allow greater scope for managerial authority to improve public sector performance are 
also being initiated.   
 
Looking forward, the law provides for the preparation of a medium term fiscal strategy that will be 
endorsed by the Council of Ministers and which will inform the preparation of a medium term budget.  This 
will start with the preparation of the 2006 budget.  Defining and adhering to the medium term fiscal 
strategy will be key in building the credibility of government.  
 
Box contributed by Anand Rajaram. 
 
Box 9 summarizes recent studies which identify debt thresholds for MACs.  The vast majority of 
MACs exceed the identified thresholds.  
 
Box 9.  Debt Thresholds Identified By Recent Studies 
 
Three studies done at the IMF examine the difficult issue of debt thresholds: 
• Based on a country’s fiscal track record over 1985-2002, namely, its past ability to generate primary 
fiscal surpluses which are then discounted by the difference between a market-based interest rate and 
past average growth performance, IMF (2003, page 130) computes a sustainable level of debt for the 
median MAC to be 25 percent of GDP based on a sample of 21 MACs.  The actual median level of 
public debt-to-GDP in these MACs was a huge two-and-a-half times the benchmark median level of 25 
percent, indicating substantial over-borrowing.   
 33
• Using a sample of 53 high, middle and low income countries over 1970-2001, Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003) find country-specific external debt (public plus private) thresholds in the range of 15-
20 percent of GDP for countries that have a history of default and high inflation.   
• Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2004) [PPR] find that external debt (public plus private) may start exerting 
a negative effect on growth at levels as low as 18 percent of GDP or 65 percent of exports, based on a 
sample of 61 developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East over the 
1969-98 period, with the sample tilted towards MACs.  
 
The results of the three studies cited above need to be qualified.  The computation of sustainable debt levels 
by the methodology in IMF (2003) would suggest that countries such as Brazil, which have raised primary 
surpluses substantially, now have higher sustainable debt levels, especially as interest rates have fallen.  
But the opposite is true: the increases in primary surpluses have been driven by the recognition that current 
debt levels are not sustainable.  Likewise, “bad” histories and debt intolerance can be overcome over a 
decade or two, as the examples in IMF (2004) indicate.  And the results in PPR could be driven by 
weaknesses in policies, institutions and governance, which could explain both high indebtedness and low 
growth; the influence of such factors is difficult to measure.    
 
 
 
6.  WHAT IS BEING DONE ABOUT MAC PUBLIC DEBT? 
 
Given the evidence presented above, MACs should in general aim to permanently lower 
public debt-to-GDP levels in order to reduce vulnerability and create a better platform for growth.  
This applies to countries such as Brazil, Jamaica and Turkey, which are already committed to 
reducing public indebtedness by running primary surpluses of unprecedented magnitude. Even 
countries such as India, which are not under any imminent threat of a crisis, are concerned about 
the impact of public debt and spending composition on long-run growth.  Even success stories 
like Chile, Korea and Russia are attempting to lower public indebtedness.  The discussion below 
focuses on the two extremes: where there is a clear public debt overhang and public indebtedness 
is hurting growth (e.g., Brazil, Jamaica, and Turkey); and where public debt is not a constraint to 
growth but is being paid down nevertheless (e.g., Chile, Korea, and Thailand). 
 
6.1  Highly Indebted Countries 
In this group, the priority is to lower public indebtedness.  To a large extent, the question 
of “How?” is being answered by the countries themselves: “By running large primary fiscal 
surpluses, and thereby signaling the country’s determination not to either inflate away its debt or 
default in an attempt to improve creditworthiness and lower spreads.”45  Countries choosing this 
course have displayed remarkable political stamina and commitment.  Two concerns have arisen 
during this process.  The first is that political commitment might falter.  The second is that the 
quality of the fiscal adjustment leaves a lot to be desired, as public investment programs have 
been cut to the bone, creating infrastructure gaps that could hurt growth and thereby compromise 
the process of attaining debt sustainability, as discussed in the section on the conceptual 
framework.   
While both concerns are well-founded, we focus on the second one.  Discussions of the 
possibly self-defeating form of fiscal adjustment tend to pay insufficient attention to the role of 
the market, politics and the quality of public investments.  If the market is unforgiving as 
                                                     
45 But, as noted above, we cannot rule out that this attitude is endogenous to the historically low interest 
rates since 9/11/2001. 
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manifested in high borrowing spreads, a country has decided not to default and public 
infrastructure projects lose money, then cutting public investment might be the optimal way of 
reducing indebtedness; indeed, if public investments lose money, then these should be cut back 
irrespective of whether there is a debt problem or not.  Efforts to create fiscal space for high-
return public infrastructure (or any other) investments thus need to consider several factors: 
(a) How does the return on infrastructure investments compare with the marginal cost of 
borrowing?  If the return on infrastructure investments is lower than the marginal cost of 
borrowing (which is likely to be the case for debt intolerant countries), increasing 
infrastructure investments could actually lower net worth.  The efficiency of infrastructure 
service provision and its pricing become priority issues.    
(b) How can governments assure a high return on new infrastructure investments without first 
addressing the existing portfolio?  For example, the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in India 
lost almost one rupee on each unit of power sold in 2001, and it sold more than 3000 million 
units per month.46  Can it feasibly price power differently for the marginal project without 
first reforming the whole power sector?  If the inherited portfolio of infrastructure 
investments (pricing, regulation etc.) is fixed, this will increase fiscal space and net worth.  
(c) Have other possibilities to enhance fiscal space been explored? Two prime alternatives are 
revenue mobilization, which is a prime consideration in the Philippines; and improving the 
composition and efficiency of non-interest current spending—a consideration that is 
applicable to Brazil, which has an exceptionally high revenue-to-GDP ratio.   
(d) Have structural reforms to encourage growth been implemented?   
 
6.2  Creditworthy Yet Paying Down Public Debt 
Are countries like Chile, Korea, Russia, and Thailand making a mistake by paying down 
debt in spite of enjoying investment grade status?  The following factors can help in trying to 
answer this complex question: 
• What is the primary role of the state and how is it being redefined?  It may be more than a 
coincidence that countries regarded as successful are paying off debt and self-insuring by 
building up net foreign assets.  The government becomes the shock absorber and provider of 
insurance, while the private sector becomes the engine of growth.  This pattern is illustrated 
by the experience of East Asian countries such as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, 
in the aftermath of the 1997-98 crisis, as summed up in Table 5 above. The emphasis in these 
countries—and also in Chile—has shifted to policies, institutions and governance to 
minimize domestic moral hazard and financial sector vulnerabilities, which were at the heart 
of the 1997-98 crisis.   
• Are there high return investment opportunities in infrastructure or the social sectors that are 
not being exploited?  If the economic rate of return is higher than the cost of borrowing but 
the financial rate of return is lower, a case can be made for subsidies financed by taxes, not 
by borrowing.  Borrowing under these circumstances would adversely affect debt dynamics. 
Without knowing more about these two factors as well as the political economy and social 
compact in these countries, it is difficult to take a position on whether or not these countries 
should cease paying down public debt and building up reserves.   
 
                                                     
46 “White Paper on Tamil Nadu Government’s Finances.” Government of Tamil Nadu, 18 August 2001, 
page 32. 
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6.3  International Development Community 
Three areas have received attention in recent years: (i) proposals on strengthening the 
international financial architecture (IFA); (ii) proposals on new lending instruments; and (iii) 
upgrading debt sustainability analysis (DSA) to better anticipate looming problems.  
Notwithstanding numerous initiatives, tangible progress has been limited.   
 
On the IFA related to crisis resolution, the only proposal to take root is the inclusion of 
collective action clauses (CACs) in new sovereign bond issues.  CACs attempt to overcome the 
“collective action problem” epitomized by Elliott Associates vs. Peru, and thereby speed up debt 
restructuring agreements in the aftermath of a crisis.47 A more ambitious attempt is contained in 
the proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), described in Box 10.  It has 
not so far gained support among either debtor countries or their creditors.   
 
Box 10.  The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) 
 
The occurrence of a number of high-profile crises since the mid-1990’s (e.g. Argentina, Turkey, Russia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, Mexico), has reawakened the debate about an efficient resolution mechanism 
that would benefit both creditors and countries.  The IMF proposed the SDRM in 2001 “to ensure the 
orderly and timely restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debts” and reach agreement with a “diffuse 
group of creditors…to agree collectively to a restructuring that reduces the net present value of its 
obligations to a manageable level”.1/  
 
The following benefits have been emphasized: 
• The SDRM overcomes the collective action problems that contribute to delays in debt restructuring by 
making the decisions of a qualified majority of creditors binding on all 
• It provides a more predictable and timely process compared to the current system. 
 
At the same time, unresolved questions remain: 
• Debt coverage is limited  (domestic debt is excluded), which has become increasingly important 
throughout the 1990s 
• It may not be more predictable/transparent as there will continue to be the potential for legal challenges 
• If SDRM activation is left to the debtor country, the same incentives that lead to procrastination and 
wanting to delay admitting unsustainability (as in Argentina and Russia) would apply 
• Without some automaticity, e.g., linking secondary market prices to apportioning a haircut among 
different creditor groups, it is not clear how the resolution will be hastened or made more transparent. 
 
Eventually, however, the proposal will fly only if creditors and debtor countries believe it is a good idea 
and so far strong support has not materialized.  
 
1/ Krueger (2002). 
                                                     
47 The collective action problem refers to a situation where a small minority of creditors stays out of an 
agreement reached with the majority: they hold out in the hope of securing a better deal for themselves.  
Elliott Associates sued Peru for full payment on the original terms after Peru had reached an agreement 
with 180 creditors, obtaining a restraining order on restructured payments in the process.  Rather than 
default on its restructured debt, Peru settled out-of-court, paying Elliott $56 million in 2000 for 
unrestructured debt that had been purchased in the secondary market for $11 million in 1996.  More 
recently, in spite of the absence of CACs, Argentina was able to complete its restructuring of $100 billion 
of bonds it had defaulted upon in December 2001 at 34 cents on the dollar when a New York court of 
appeals struck down the attempt of a small group of hold-out investors to scuttle the restructuring deal, 
which had earlier been accepted by investors holding 76 percent of the debt (Financial Times, 3 June 2005, 
“Argentina closes door on Dollars 100bn debt exchange”, by Adam Thomson).  
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On new instruments, two proposals that have received wide attention are GDP-indexed 
bonds and a proposal for overcoming “original sin”, as discussed in section 2.3.  Both proposals 
provoke the question of why such instruments have not been introduced spontaneously by the 
market: is it because of barriers to financial innovation, and therefore the  need for the IFIs to 
play a catalytic role in generating a critical mass?  Or is it that fundamental economic problems 
need to be addressed in policies, institutions and governance, which take time to address and will 
not be solved by such instruments?  Whichever the answer, the development of such instruments 
is not imminent. 
 
 Another area of progress is debt sustainability analysis (DSA); but it may be difficult to 
develop practical approaches to key issues.  These include ascertaining whether the real exchange 
rate is in equilibrium or not, and how to model and estimate the interactions among primary fiscal 
balances, real interest rates and growth.  Inadequate data, especially on contingent liabilities, 
represents yet another impediment. A recent review of methods to incorporate uncertainty into 
DSA, including those being developed in the IMF, concludes that the IMF approach is likely to 
be the most valuable for practitioners.48   
In sum, the main breakthrough so far in the field of MAC debt is at the country level.  
The evident willingness of some countries to address unsustainable public debt situations by 
reestablishing creditworthiness through fiscal effort is worth encouraging.  How exactly IFIs can 
encourage such efforts is a matter of some debate; what should not be debated is that stronger 
fiscal fundamentals are a necessary condition for success; for most countries, this implies 
lowering public debt levels.   
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The macroeconomic crises of the 1980s and 1990s have spurred concerns about 
sovereign debt and capital account openness.  Based on a framework drawn from the growth, 
capital flows and crisis literature, we find that sovereign debt is constraining growth in MACs at 
current levels of indebtedness.  However, the chances of another 1980s-type crisis have receded 
since the turbulence of the late 1990s.  On what is being done, the willingness of countries facing 
debt sustainability problems to persistently run large primary fiscal surpluses stands out.  Based 
on the relatively low thresholds for debt sustainability identified in the literature and the even 
lower thresholds at which public debt seems to hurt growth, this response is justified. 
For MACs, a major lesson of the crises of the 1980s and 1990s is that paying attention to 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (GIBC) is vital.  Crises, no matter their origin 
in the public or private sector, tend to end up affecting the GIBC adversely.  It is not enough to 
achieve single-digit inflation, as Russia did just six months before its 1998 meltdown; it is not 
enough to ensure that macroeconomic policy is conservative and that the public finances are in 
good order, as in Korea before 1997-98.  The channels through which the GIBC gets affected are 
varied and not always straightforward.  In addition to the standard variables—primary fiscal 
balances, real interest rates and growth rates—these include whether or not the enterprise and 
financial sectors are efficient and competitive with well-structured balance sheets; contingent 
liabilities, whether explicit (guaranteeing bonds issues by loss-making state enterprises) or 
implicit (bailing out banks even when there is no explicit deposit insurance); over-valued real 
exchange rates; and pension reform costs.  Also included is the potential impact of exogenous 
shocks, when the government may be called upon to play the role of a shock absorber.  Assessing 
                                                     
48 Burnside (2004), drawing upon IMF (2002, 2003b). 
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debt sustainability thus requires looking at a host of complex variables, including contingent 
liabilities, the micro-foundations for sustainable economic growth and the vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks. 
 
If a country is experiencing public debt sustainability problems, it can safely be assumed 
that the impact on growth is negative—from the growth perspective, optimal debt levels are likely 
to be lower than sustainable debt. Moreover, the causality is more likely to flow from 
unsustainable public debt dynamics to low growth than vice-versa; a country with low growth 
potential is unlikely to attract market financing to begin with.  The channels through which public 
debt affect growth include uncertainty about future inflation and taxation created by the debt 
overhang, crowding out and fiscal space problems, whereby high interest payments squeeze out 
public investment and social spending.   
 
Concerns about fiscal space have led to the argument that countries which cut public 
infrastructure investments as part of fiscal adjustment could end up hurting the GIBC by reducing 
long-run growth.  This argument raises at least four sets of issues: How do the economic and 
financial rates of return on infrastructure projects compare with the government’s borrowing 
cost?  Is there scope for reducing wastage in government spending, thereby increasing public 
saving, and can expenditure composition be better aligned with growth?  Can the microeconomic 
foundation for growth be strengthened through structural reform?  What are the market signals on 
default and devaluation risk?   
 
There are a priori reasons to believe that countries for which the markets are signaling an 
unsustainable debt situation need to address this first even if the short-run impact on growth is 
negative.  As noted above, overborrowing is more easily explained by political economy than 
economics; this is reinforced by the debt intolerance argument.  Both political economy and debt 
intolerance lead to similar conclusions: that if fiscal deficits are shaped by politics and weak 
fiscal and financial institutions, a presumption of wasteful spending and poor public investment 
project selection would be reasonable.  In this case, fiscal and institutional reform would need to 
precede any expansion of public investment spending. 
 
A puzzling question remains: Why does the market allow overborrowing, especially by 
debt intolerant countries?  To the extent that moral hazard fueled by expectations of an IFI bailout 
is a possible explanation, this is likely to have diminished after the Russian crisis of 1998 and the 
Argentine crisis which began in 2001.  In the Russian case, only about a fourth of the IFI-led 
rescue package of $22.6 billion was disbursed before being halted less than a month after being 
approved, notwithstanding expectations that possession of nuclear weapons implied that Russia 
could not be allowed to fail.  Nonresident investors suffered an estimated 70 percent loss of the 
face value of their holdings of ruble-denominated treasury bills and bonds as a result of the 
devaluation and default. And the agreement reached with the London Club in August 2000 
involved a 50 percent write-off in present value terms of the $31.8 billion Russia owed.  More 
recently, the conclusion in June 2005 of the Argentine debt restructuring deal at 34 cents on the 
dollar in present value terms involving $100 billion in bonds defaulted upon in December 2001 
has inflicted a loss of $67 billion on the bondholders.49          
 
If the experience with financial liberalization had been in line with the predictions of 
neoclassical growth theory, and if the experience with sovereign debt during the 1990s had been 
                                                     
49 Financial Times, 3 June 2005, “Argentina closes door on Dollars 100bn debt exchange”, by Adam 
Thomson. 
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more positive, the chances are that this paper would not have been written.  But in the face of 
mounting evidence that capital market liberalization and access to external finance have more 
likely increased vulnerability than spurred growth, some hard issues arise.  MACs should in 
general aim to lower public indebtedness.  Their debt tolerance would go up with better policies, 
institutions and governance.  But becoming debt tolerant is a time-consuming process.  Can IFIs 
help to speed it up?  For example, for countries that are developing a track record of fiscal 
credibility, can the IFIs help speed up the attainment of permanently lower debt-to-GDP levels by 
buying out private debt to lengthen maturity and lower borrowing costs?  Given the magnitude of 
outstanding public external debt for countries like Turkey and Brazil ($53 billion and $60 billion 
respectively, at end-2003) and already high Bank-IMF exposure levels ($21 billion and $28 
billion respectively, see Table 8), such a course does not seem feasible given the current resource 
base of the IFIs.  
 
Table 8.  Selected Countries with Large Exposure to the IMF and World Bank, 2003 
 
In the absence of a fundamental shift in the thinking about market-based development 
finance for MACs, therefore, MACs have little option but to adjust to their market-determined 
external financing constraint and reduce public indebtedness through fiscal restraint and 
institutional reform.  This general conclusion follows from the evidence pointing to low 
thresholds at which public debt risks becoming fiscally unsustainable and the even lower 
thresholds at which debt begins to harm economic growth.  
 
Share in Share in Share in 
Outstanding Credit and Loans Total External Debt Public Sector Debt GDP
bln US$ % % %
WB IMF WB IMF WB IMF WB IMF
Argentina 7.92 10.69 5.61 11.24 4.17 8.35 6.09 12.20
Brazil 8.66 19.06 4.15 13.46 2.98 9.66 1.75 5.67
Indonesia 10.27 6.92 7.64 7.60 6.85 6.81 4.95 4.92
Russia 6.43 3.25 3.63 2.73 4.24 3.18 1.42 1.06
Turkey 5.27 16.06 3.71 16.64 3.15 14.15 2.21 9.92
Uruguay 0.75 1.63 5.95 19.17 5.49 17.67 6.68 21.50
Source: WB Annual Report, 2003; IMF Financial Statement, 2004; author's calculations
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Table A. List of Market Access Countries (MACs) and Low Income Countries (LICs) 
MACs LICs 
Brady countries HIPCs 
Argentina Benin Madagascar 
Brazil Bolivia** Malawi 
Bulgaria Burkina Faso Mali 
Costa Rica Burundi Mauritania 
Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon* Mozambique 
Dominican Republic Central African Republic Myanmar 
Ecuador Chad Nicaragua 
Jordan Comoros Niger 
México Congo DR Rwanda 
Nigeria Congo, Rep. Of Sao Tome & Principe 
Panama Cote d'Ivoire* Senegal 
Peru Etiopía Sierra Leone 
Philippines Gambia Somalia 
Poland Ghana Sudan 
Uruguay Guinea Tanzania 
Venezuela Guinea-Bissau Togo 
Vietnam Guyana Uganda 
 Honduras Vietnam**** 
 Laos Zambia 
 Liberia  
Non-Brady MACs Non-HIPC LICs 
Algeria Afganistán Lesotho 
Chile Angora Moldova 
China Azerbaijan Mongolia 
Colombia Bangladesh Nepal 
Croatia Bhutan Nigeria* 
Egypt Cambodia Papua New Guinea 
Hungary Equatorial Guinea Solomon Islands 
India**** Eritrea Tajikistan 
Indonesia**** Georgia Timor-Leste 
Korea, Rep. of Haiti Uzbekistan 
Lebanon Kenya Vietnam 
Malaysia Korea, Dem. Rep. Yemen, Rep. 
Morocco Kyrgyz Republic Zimbabwe 
Pakistan**** Lao PDR  
Russia   
South Africa   
Thailand   
Tunisia   
Turkey   
Ukraine   
Notes: *        Countries that have moved status from middle-income to low-income 
**      Countries that are still middle-income, but do not have market access 
***    Countries that are part of the HIPC-eligible set, but may not seek or get HIPC relief 
****  MACs that are classified as low income countries by the Bank (threshold is $735 per capita) 
  
